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ANDREW A. SMITH, MARGARET A. MOOTE, CECIL
R. SCHWALBE

The Endangered Species Act at
Twenty: An Analytical Survey of
Federal Endangered Species
Protection
ABSTRACT
The Endangered Species Act of 1973 ("ESA") is both praised
and criticizedfor its efforts to protect speciesfrom extinction. Its
stringent provisions spark controversies pitting species preservation against economic and other concerns. This paper analyzes issues central to debate on the ESA as it faces congressional
reauthorization.Questionsfocus on measures that form the basis
for species preservation under the ESA, federal government's role
in its implementation, funding problems, conflicts with private
property rights,and the ESA's basicapproach to conservation. The
paper concludes that preservationpolicy must evolve with societal
and scientific change, shifting its focus toward implementing
ecosystem management techniques.
INTRODUCTION
Extinctions of plant and animal species irreversibly change the
world. Although extinctions have been occurring naturally for millions
of years, modern human-induced extinction rates may surpass the highest natural extinction events in Earth's history by an order of magnitude. 1 In the 500 years since Columbus arrived in North America, some
500 plant and animal species have gone extinct in the United States
alone.2 Worldwide, an average of perhaps one species goes extinct per
day, a rate that appears to be accelerating. 3 In the long term, human* School of Renewable Natural Resources, University of Arizona, Tucson. The authors
would like to thank Hanna Cortner, Mari Jensen, David King, Mitchel McClaran, Pamela
Raczynski, and John Wertheim for insightful comments on earlier drafts of this paper.
Cate Bradley, Donna Chickering, Mark Flickinger, Sandra Johnson, and Livdyte Novickis
helped develop the original manuscript on which this paper is based.
1. N. Myers, The Sinking Ark: A New Look at the Problem of Disappearing Species
3 (1979). See also, Office of Technology Assessment, Technologies to Maintain Biological
Diversity 63 (1987) [hereinafter OTA Report).
2. P. Opler, The Paradeof Passing Species: A Survey of Extinctions in the U.S., 43 The
Science Teacher 30 (1976); Council for Environmental Quality, Environmental Quality:
21st Annual Report 136 (1990).
3 Myers, supra note 1, at 5 (predicting that the worldwide extinction rate may
skyrocket to one hundred per day by the end of this century). One noted biologist
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4
induced extinctions threaten the quality of life throughout the world,
elevating species preservation to the status of a foremost societal goal.
The more immediate demand for jobs and basic amenities, however, tempers society's response to the potential consequences of species
extinction. When peoples' needs conflict with the existence of a plant
or animal species, society faces a dilemma. Consider the northern spotted owl controversy in the old-growth forests of the Pacific Northwest. 5
If society chooses to follow the recommendations of scientists and sets
aside large acreages of old-growth timber for habitat protection, thousands of people will lose their sole source of income and traditional
way of life. 6 If society opts to continue logging at the same rate in order
to protect those jobs for the short term, the world will likely lose one
more species forever, and loggers will inevitably lose their jobs as the
timber disappears. 7 The prolonged economic recession, combined with
highly visible conflicts like the spotted owl controversy, has fostered8
a potent movement against preservationist policies in the United States.
At the same time, public awareness of the dangers of environmental
degradation may be at an all-time high,9 and the new administration
recently estimated that one-fifth or more of the earth's species could be subject to
extinction by the year 2020. E. Wilson, The Diversity of Life 346 (1992).
4. See generally P. Ehrlich, The Loss of Diversity: Causes and Consequences, in Biodiversity
21, 21 (E. Wilson ed., 1988).
5. For legal analyses of the spotted owl controversy, see M. Bonnett & K. Zimmerman,
Politics and Preservation: The Endangered Species Act and the Northern Spotted Owl, 18
Ecology L.Q. 105 (1991); M. Blumm, Ancient Forests, Spotted Owls, and Modern Public Land
Law, 18 B.C. Envtl. Aff. L. Rev. 605 (1991); G. Meyers, Old-Growth Forests, the Owl, and
Yew: EnvironmentalEthics Versus TraditionalDispute Resolution under the EndangeredSpecies
Act and Other Public Lands and Resources Law, 18 B.C. Envtl. Aff. L. Rev. 623 (1991).
6. Estimates of job losses in the timber industry as a result of spotted owl protection
range from 12,000 to more than 140,000, depending on what group is making the estimate.
V. Sample & D. LeMaster, Economic Effects of Northern Spotted Owl Protection:An Examination
of Four Studies, 90 J. Forestry 31, 34 (Aug. 1992).
7. The spotted owl controversy is more complicated than jobs versus owls. Even
absent old-growth protection measures, the timber industry has been on the decline "as
a result of recessions, mill modernization, timber shortages, export of raw logs, and
cutbacks in domestic finishing and manufacturing operations." Meyers, supra note 5, at
640-41. See also E. Foley, The Tarnishing of an Environmental Jewel: The EndangeredSpecies
Act and the Northern Spotted Owl, 8 J. Land Use & Envtl. L. 253, 258 n.36 (1992).
8. At the center of this movement are "wise-use" groups that have organized to
counter the "extremism" of environmental groups that put protection of wilderness and
wildlife before the welfare of humans. C. Alexander, Gunningfor Greens, Time, Feb. 3,
1992, at 50.
9. R. Dunlap, Trends in Public Opinion toward Environmental Issues, 4 Soc'y & Nat.
Resources 285, 312 (1991). See also V. Sher & C. Hunting, Eroding the Landscape, Eroding
the Laws: Congressional Exemptions from Judicial Review of Environmental Laws, 15 Harv.
Envtl. L. Rev. 435, 486 nn.255-56 (1991) (noting that in 1989, 80 percent of respondents
to a New York Times and CBS News poll agreed with the statement "Protecting the
environment is so important that requirements and standards cannot be too high, and
continuing environmental improvements must be made regardless of cost.") (citing N.Y.
Times, July 2, 1989, at Al).
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has posited that environmental protection does not preclude economic
10
development or the continuance of traditional, resource-based lifestyles.
At the center of this controversy lies the Endangered Species
Act of 1973 ("ESA").11 The ESA embodies a legal conviction to preserve
and recover species in danger of extinction "as a consequence of economic growth and development." 12 Expressing a concern over modem extinction rates, Congress equipped the ESA with powerful regulatory
13
tools that place species preservation above almost all other interests.
For two decades, the ESA has weathered Congressional reauthorizations and amendments largely unscathed. 14 The ESA is again up for
15
reauthorization and faces perhaps its strongest opposition to date.
Reauthorization of the ESA provides an opportunity for resolving disputes between preservationist concerns and economic interests.
This article examines the underlying basis for preserving species,
how the ESA approaches the problem of extinction, and how it might
better achieve its stated goals. Part I reviews rationales for the protection of endangered species. Part II profiles significant provisions of the
ESA, the most significant federal law that attempts to solve the problem of species extinction. Part III analyzes actual ESA implementation
and discusses how Congress could make the ESA more effective, efficient, and capable of resolving conflicts between species preservation
and competing activities such as economic development.
RATIONALES FOR PROTECTING ENDANGERED SPECIES
Advocates of species preservation, including biologists, philosophers, economists, and politicians, suggest a number of theories to sup10. President Clinton, in opening remarks at a public conference on old-growth forest
controversies, suggested that parties to such conflicts could "move beyond confrontation
to build a consensus on a balanced policy to preserve jobs and to protect the environment."
B. Clinton, A New Startfor Northwest Forests, 13 Forest Watch, Apr./May 1993, at 17. See
also A. Gore, Earth in the Balance: Ecology and the Human Spirit (1992).
11. Pub. L. No. 93-205, 87 Stat. 884 (1973) (current version at 16 U.S.C. §§ 1531-1544
(1988)).
12. 16 U.S.C. § 1531(a)(1).
13. See infra part II. According to the Supreme Court, "examination of the language,
history, and structure of the [ESA] indicates beyond doubt that Congress intended
endangered species to be afforded the highest of priorities." Tennessee Valley Authority
v. Hill, 437 U.S. 153, 174 (1978).
14. The ESA has been amended four times: Pub. L. No. 95-632, 92 Stat. 3751 (1978);
Pub. L. No. 96-159, 93 Stat. 1225 (1979); Pub. L. No. 97-304, 96 Stat. 1411 (1982); Pub. L.
No. 100-478, 102 Stat. 2306 (1988).
15. The ESA was originally slated for review in 1992, but lost out to reauthorization
of other environmental statutes and election-year politics. See J. Satterfield, A Tale of
Sound and Fury. The Environmental Record of the 102d Congress, 23 Envtl. L. Rep. (Envtl.
L. Inst.) 10,015 (1993) (noting that the Chairman of the House Subcommittee on Fisheries
and Wildlife Conservation and the Environment announced that ESA reauthorization
would not proceed until the spotted owl conflict was resolved). Reauthorization is not
expected before late 1993 or even 1994. State Group Representative Predicts Action only on
Clean Water, Safe Drinking Water Acts, 24 Env't Rep. (BNA) 199 (1993).
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port the prevention of human-induced extinctions of plant and animal
species. The many rationales for preserving species generally fall into
four categories: direct economic uses, ecological services, aesthetic benefits, and moral and ethical duties.
Direct Economic Uses
Plant and animal species are valuable as sources of food, medicines, and other commodities, helping to support a surprisingly broad
range of economic activities. At least a third of the approximately
235,000 known flowering plant species are edible. Many of these species
may become valuable new food crops, or serve to protect existing food
sources, particularly in deteriorating environments. 16 Some species
yield substances critical for medicinal purposes. 17 Laboratory studies
involving plant and animal species help develop human vaccines and
organ transplants, and greatly advance health and other sciences. Agriculture relies on honey bees to pollinate crops, nitrogen-fixing legumes
insects to serve as natural alternatives
to enrich the soil, and predatory
18
to pesticides and herbicides.
Technological advancement leads to further discovery of economically viable uses of plant and animal species. Improvement of genetic-engineering techniques render even the most obscure species
valuable as reservoirs of genes that may cure human ailments, increase
crop resistance to diseases and pests, or provide commercial quanti19
ties of substances previously unknown or too expensive to produce.
Advances in other fields transform previously overlooked species into
profitable sources of useful organic substances. 20 The list of species
contributing tangible benefits to society grows each year.
16. P. Raven et al., Biology of Plants 621-49 (4th ed. 1986). For example, biologists
recently have developed crops tolerant of increasingly saline soils in arid and semiarid
regions. Id. at 641. Cross-breeding wild strains with domesticated crop species, such as

wheat and corn, can introduce important genetic traits for disease and pest resistance,
and has helped stave off major agricultural disasters. P. Ehrlich & A. Ehrlich, Extinction:
The Causes and Consequences of the Disappearance of Species 65-66 (1981). See also N.
Myers, A Wealth of Wild Species: Storehouse for Human Welfare 57-62 (1983) (asserting
that preservation of wild genotypes is critical to developing new methods of repelling
agricultural pests).
17. Approximately one-fourth of the prescription drugs sold in the United States are

derived from plants. OTA Report, supra note I, at 4. The rosy periwinkle, native to
Madagascar, was rescued from the brink of extinction in the 1960s when scientists
discovered it produces compounds that greatly increase remission rates of certain cancers.

Raven et al., supra note 16, at 642.
18. OTA Report, supra note 1, at 49-53, 206.
19. P. Raven & G. Johnson, Biology 347-63 (1986).
20. The jojoba plant, a desert shrub of the southwestern United States, has recently
been cultivated to produce oils useful as lubricants for heavy machinery and automobile
transmissions. Jojoba oil also has applications in the cosmetic and food additive industries.
The oils cannot be produced synthetically in commercial quantities, and the only alternative
natural source is the endangered sperm whale. Raven et al., supra note 16, at 639-40.
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Any value a species holds in providing economic benefits to
society is permanently lost when that species goes extinct. Yet increasing
numbers of species vanish each year, before their potential usefulness
to humans has been examined. 21 Fewer than one out of every six species
in tropical regions, home to approximately half of the world's species,
have even been named. 22 The current and projected rates of species
extinction and the accompanying loss of genetic materials and information potentially jeopardize future opportunities to improve human
welfare. As one legislator commented, "Preventing the extinction of
our fellow creatures is neither frivolity nor foolish environmental excess; it is the means by which we keep intact the great storehouse of
of medicine, agriculture, scinatural treasures that make the progress
23
ence, and human life itself possible."
Ecological Services
Proponents of preservation typically complement arguments
about the direct economic benefits of species with the assertion that
loss of biological diversity may have serious ecological consequences.
The millions of wild plant and animal species interact in natural ecosystems 24 to offer subtle, yet valuable, ecological services. Natural ecosystems, such as marshes, grasslands, and forests, convert carbon dioxide
into oxygen, purify water, stabilize and fertilize soils, control climates,
and provide habitat for species of direct economic value. 25 The simplified human ecosystems that result when society tills a field, paves
26
a wetland, or over-uses a natural area are deficient in these services.
The interrelationships among species-and between the living
and nonliving environment-form the basis for ecosystem functioning.
These interrelationships are so complex and intertwined that scientists
have scarcely begun to understand them. Each species depends on a
host of other species, and the loss of one species may induce additional
extinctions and unpredictable ecosystem disruption. 27 Seemingly in21. See Myers supra note 3 and accompanying text.
22. Raven & Johnson, supra note 19, at 1190.
23. J. Dingell, Foreword to D. Rohlf, The Endangered Species Act: A Guide to Its
Protections and Implementation 1, 2 (1989).
24. An "ecosystem" consists of the "community of organisms interacting with one
another and with the chemical and physical factors making up their environment." G.
Miller, Resource Conservation and Management A9 (1991). An "environment" includes
"all external conditions that affect an organism or other specified system during its lifetime."
Id. at A10.
25. Id. at 143.
26. See D. Patten, Human Impacts in the Greater Yellowstone Ecosystem, 5 Conservation
Biology 405, 407 (1991) (pointing out that highly impacted ecosystems may continue to
function but vital processes found in more natural systems may be highly modified or
absent).

27. Each plant extinction may, on average, cause the extinction of 10 other species
dependent on it. Ehrlich & Ehrlich, supra note 16, at 78-80.
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significant species may play roles vital to ecosystems that provide essential human services.2 8 Because we do not clearly understand how
species fit into even the simplest ecosystems, prudence dictates preserving as many species as possible. Such is the premise behind natuevery cog and wheel
ralist Aldo Leopold's oft-quoted maxim: "To keep
29
is the first precaution of intelligent tinkering."
Aesthetic Benefits
Valuing species for their economic and ecological benefits establishes one utilitarian, human-centered ("homocentric" or "anthropocentric") basis for preservation. Another homocentric basis for
preserving species arises when society ascribes value to species for their
beauty, uniqueness, or complexity. Such aesthetic characteristics, the
product of millions of years of evolution, ironically change in worth
at the whim of society. Wolves, bears, and eagles, once loathed as vicious predators and hunted with disregard, are now revered and pro30
tected in the United States as symbols of wilderness and freedom.
One need look no further than state flags, 31 federal postage stamps,
and team mascots to witness the variety of plant and animal species
that have secured status as aesthetic symbols. Colorful species, such
as butterflies and birds, epitomize the class of creatures we seek to protect for their sheer beauty.
Less obviously appealing species are not so fortunate, but even
the most obscure-or most common-are arguably valuable on aesthetic grounds. Groups such as snakes, spiders, and fungi gain popularity as people discover the intricacies of their physiology, behavior,
and ecology. Education and mass media can heighten aesthetic awareness, but society often fails to notice species until they become perilously rare or even extinct. 32 Once public sentiment is strong, aesthetic
28. See, e.g., Wilson, supra note 3, at 309 (1992) (stating that the identities of species
critical to ecosystem functions are largely unknown, but may include less obvious species
such as "tiny invertebrates, algae, and microorganisms").
29. A. Leopold, A Sand County Almanac 190 (1966).
30. See, e.g., Enacting clause of Bald and Golden Eagle Protection Act of June 8, 1940,
ch. 278, § 1, 54 Stat. 250 (1940) (current version at 16 U.S.C. §§ 668-668d (1985) (declaring
that "the bald eagle is no longer a mere bird of biological interest but a symbol of the
American ideals of freedom... "); S. Herrero, Man and the Grizzly Bear: Present, Past, but
Future?, 20 Bioscience 1148, 1153 (1970) ("The grizzly bear is a symbolic and living
embodiment of wild nature uncontrolled by man.").
31. Ironically, California's state flag portrays a grizzly bear, now extinct in that state.
32. Take, for example, the passenger pigeon. Once the most abundant bird in North
America, passenger pigeons moved in thunderous flocks numbering in the millions. Hunters
collected these birds en masse towards the end of the 18th century, marketing them as
inexpensive food items and even as fertilizer. Only when pigeon numbers dwindled did
people realize they were losing a wondrous creature. The last passenger pigeon died in
1914. Leopold lamented the loss:
There will always be pigeons in books and in museums, but these are effigies
and images, dead to all hardships and to all delights. Book-pigeons cannot
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valuation constitutes a viable alternative basis for protecting
species
33
that lack discernible economic and ecological value.
Moral and Ethical Duties
Moral and ethical arguments for preserving species follow two
lines of reasoning. The first argument, that it is wrong to leave future
generations a biologically impoverished world, views wild plants and
animals as a trust. 34 Most often, this proposition revolves around other
rationales for preserving species, invoking a moral duty to preserve
the economic, ecological, and aesthetic values of species for the benefit of persons not yet born. Based on this argument, our inability to
know which species will be important to future generations suggests
an obligation to preserve them all. Although it increases the range of
reasons for preventing species extinction, the trust rationale does little
more than add a temporal element to homocentric arguments for preserving species.
A second preservation argument based in morality abandons
the homocentric bias and postulates that species have an inherent right
to exist, independent of their value to humans.35 Existence itself ac-

cords a species a moral right to continue to exist, and humans have an
ethical obligation to respect this right. 36 Subscribers to this life-centered ("biocentric") view contend that asking what value a species has
to us embodies the ultimate human arrogance. 37 Although humans are
likely the only organisms with the ability to recognize, contemplate,
dive out of a cloud to make deer run for cover, or clap their wings in
thunderous applause of mast-laden woods. Book-pigeons cannot breakfast
on new-mown wheat in Minnesota, and dine on blueberries in Canada. They
know no urge of seasons; they feel no kiss of sun, no lash of wind and
weather. They live forever by not living at all.
A. Leopold, A Sand County Almanac and Sketches Here and There 109 (1989).
33. For instance, scientists have exerted great effort on restoration of the California
condor, not because it is particularly valuable in economic or ecological terms, but in
large part because it inspires people with its grandeur and uniqueness. See, e.g., Miller,
supra note 24, at 429.
34. See, e.g., Myers, supra note 1, at 18-20; Train, Who Owns American Wildlife?, in
Wildlife and America 275, 276 (H. Brokaw ed., 1978).
35. See, e.g., L. Johnson, Toward the Moral Considerabilityof Species and Ecosystems, 14
Envtl. Ethics 145 (1992); H. Rolston, Environmental Ethics: Duties to and Values in Nature
(1988).
36. See, e.g., H. Rolston, Life in Jeopardy on Private Property,in Balancing on the Brink
of Extinction: The Endangered Species Act and Lessons for the Future 43,56-57 (K. Kohm
ed. 1991) ("A rare plant's roots literally go down in the landowner's land, but it roots
historically go back across millennia, long before the land was owned, long before this
nation existed. Recent possession conveys no right to destroy species and with it the
future."); D. Ehrenfeld, The Arrogance of Humanism 207-08 (1978) ("[Species] should
be conserved because they exist and because this existence is itself but the present
expression of a continued historical process of immense antiquity and majesty. Longstanding existence in nature is deemed to carry with it the unimpeachable right to
continued existence.").
37. One theory finding that humans "are not inherently superior to other living things"
considers human and non-human species "integrated elements in a system of
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and actively control the existence of other species, the realization that
humans are but one species in the long and complex history of the natural world should foster humility, not arrogance.
The recognition of moral rights generally parallels society's conceptual awareness about the natural world. Once an ethical view gains
some threshold of public acceptance, it may be formalized into law.
The protective umbrella of legal rights has evolved to encompass a
growing number of classes of people, organisms, objects, and even abstractions such as corporations and estates.38 Extending the right of
existence to other species for their own sake is a logical next step in this
evolution. A purely biocentric ethic does not contemplate distinctions
between the inherent values of different species, allocating each, from
39
bacterium to flower to elephant, an equal claim to existence.
A Harmonized Approach
The economic, ecological, aesthetic, and moral reasons for maintaining biological diversity are not mutually exclusive propositions.
Individual species from natural ecosystems often provide direct economic benefits, and many people find intact ecosystems aesthetically
pleasing.40 Aesthetic and other valuations blend into moral duties not
to despoil natural beauty.4 1 The moral obligation to future generations
may include a duty to leave future generations a quality world in order
interdependence," with each organism representing a "unique individual pursuing its
own good in its own way." P. Taylor, Respect for Nature: A Theory for Environmental
Ethics 99-100 (1986).
38. C. Stone, Should Trees Have Standing? Towards Legal Rights for Natural Objects
3-10 (1988).
39. The biocentric view of species preservation, which admonishes the destruction
of species, differs from the animal liberation view that admonishes the destruction of
lives, particularly the lives of sentient creatures. M. Sagoff, Animal Liberation and
EnvironmentalEthics: Bad Marriage,Quick Divorce, 22 Osgoode Hall L.J. 297 (1984). Thus,
a preservationist might favor the slaughter of feral goats, if it were the only way to stop
the goats from consuming an endangered species of plant. A staunch animal rights
activist would not value the lives of the remaining plants above the lives of the goats
and would oppose the slaughter.
40. The aesthetic argument for preserving ecosystems may be stronger than for
preserving single species. See, e.g., H. Doremus, Comment, Patching the Ark: Improving
Legal Protection of Biological Diversity, 18 Ecology L.Q. 265, 308 (1991). ("The possible
extinction of spotted owls is not the best reason to stop cutting the old-growth forests;
the possible extinction of this unique ecosystem is. Allowing the dispute to be cast as
humans versus owls misrepresents and trivializes the issue.") The enormous popularity
of National Parks, some of the most pristine natural ecosystems remaining in the United
States, exemplifies this premise, but also illustrates the "double-edge sword of popularity."
National Parks and Conservation Ass'n, A Race Against Time: Five Threats Endangering
America's National Parks and the Solutions to Avert Them 24 (Aug. 20, 1991) (noting
that from 1980-1990 visitations to National Parks increased by almost 100 million annually
to over 250 million in 1990, but the impacts from these visitations are having devastating
effects on the natural and cultural resources in the parks).
41. This sentiment was summed up concisely in a letter from Chief Sealth of the
Duwamish tribe of Washington state to President Franklin Pierce in 1855: "If all the
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nature's values, not just to postpone the exploitation of
to perpetuate
42
resources.
Trademark strengths and weaknesses accompany each rationale
for preserving species. For instance, the biocentric view contemplates
the most comprehensive species protection because it does not value
one species' existence over another, but is often unpersuasive to politi-

43
cians whose constituencies demand economic relief. Utilitarian ra-

tionales avoid this pitfall, but do not protect species that society currently
views as less valuable than some competing interest. 4 4 Despite these
limitations, the various rationales for preserving species remain compelling arguments for legislation to protect species in danger of extinction.
PROVISIONS OF THE ENDANGERED SPECIES ACT
The Endangered Species Act of 197345 marks a significant step
in the advancement of species preservation. Prior to the ESA, federal
involvement in the management of wildlife, once the domain of the
states, had been steadily increasing. 46 Predecessors to the ESA, the Endangered Species Protection Act of 196647 and the Endangered Species
Conservation Act of 1969, 48 recognized the importance of general species
preservation, but accorded endangered species little more than symbolic protection. In contrast to these earlier efforts, the ESA implemented staunch measures that elevated endangered species preservation
to unprecedented heights. The core of the ESA is substantive provisions that protect plant and animal species on a variety of fronts, imcivil and criminal penalties for violations of ESA
posing severe
49
mandates.
beasts were gone, men would die from great loneliness of spirit." Quoted in P. Nobokov,
Native American Testimony 109 (1987).
42. M. Sagoff, The Economy of the Earth 60-65 (1991).
43. Legislators generally avoid citing moral reasons for preserving species and instead
favor utilitarian reasons or a combination of moral and utilitarian reasons. See, e.g., Doremus,
supra note 40, at 275-76 nn.71,72.
44. One observer faults utilitarian rationales for frequently leading to exaggerated,
distorted, and implausible claims about the value of preserving a species, discrediting
the preservation ideal. D. Ehrenfeld, The Conservationof Non-Resources, 64 Am. Scientist
648,651 (1976). Even when valuations of a species are feasible, society may value interests
incompatible with preservation higher. Id. at 653. Based on a purely economic calculus,
the incompatible interests would then be favored, at the expense of the species. See also
D. Ehrenfeld, Why Put a Value on Biodiversity?, in Biodiversity 212 (E. Wilson ed., 1988).
45. Pub. L. No. 93-205, 87 Stat. 884 (1973) (current version at 16 U.S.C. §§ 1531-1544

(1988)).
46. For a discussion of the history of federal wildlife law in the United States, see
M. Bean, The Evolution of National Wildlife Law (1983); K. Sheldon, Wildlife, in Sustainable
Environmental Law: Integrating Natural Resource and Pollution Abatement Law from
Resources to Recovery 279, 280-312 (C. Campbell-Mohm et al. eds., 1993).
47. Pub. L. No. 89-669, 80 Stat. 926 (1966) (repealed 1973).
48. Pub. L. No. 91-135, 83 Stat. 275 (1969) (repealed 1973).
49. For more extensive examinations of ESA provisions, see D. Rohlf, The Endangered
Species Act: A Guide to Its Protections and Implementation 37-179 (1989); R. Littell,
Endangered and Other Protected Species: Federal Law and Regulation 7-108 (1992).
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The ESA embodies a Congressional intent to "conserve" all endangered and threatened species and the ecosystems upon which they
depend.- ° More than a charge to preserve samples of nature's vast assortment of vanishing plants and animals in zoos, parks, and laboratories, the ESA calls for the protection and restoration of species in
their natural ecosystems. Under the ESA, "conserve" broadly denotes
the exercise of "all methods and procedures which are necessary" to
recover a species until it no longer requires ESA protection. 51 Maintenance of species at perilously low, albeit constant, population levels
runs contrary to this definition.
A two-tiered classification scheme separates species into groups
warranting different levels of attention. A species is "endangered"and thus deserves the most stringent ESA protection measures-when
it is "in danger of extinction throughout all or a significant portion of
its range."5 2 A "threatened" species is one likely to become endangered "within the foreseeable future."5 3 The ESA defines "species"
broadly to include subspecies and, in the case of vertebrate animals,
"any distinct population segment."5 4 The inclusion of subspecies and
populations in this definition greatly expands the scope of the ESA, affording protection to isolated units of a single species, even if the
species does not need protection elsewhere in its range.
The Secretary of Interior ("Secretary") publishes and periodically revises a list of all threatened and endangered species in the Federal Register in accordance with section 4 of the ESA. 5 - Any interested
party may petition to have a species' status reviewed,5 6 but final authority for recognizing a species as threatened or endangered rests
with either the Secretary of the Interior or Secretary of Commerce. The
National Marine Fisheries Service ("NMFS"), acting under the Secretary of Commerce, oversees most marine species and advises the Secretary of Interior of its listing decisions.57 The Interior's Fish and
Wildlife Service ("FWS") administers terrestrial and freshwater species
and is charged with the bulk of the duties under the ESA. 58 In either
50. 16 U.S.C. § 1531(a) (1988).
51. Id. § 1532(3).
52. Id. § 1532(6). "Range," which is not defined in the ESA, denotes in this context
"the region throughout which a kind of organism ... naturally lives or occurs." Webster's
Ninth New Collegiate Dictionary 974 (1984).

53.
54.
55.
56.

16 U.S.C. § 1532(20).
Id. § 1532(16).
Id. § 1533(c).
Id. § 1533(b)(3).

57. Id. § 1533(a)(2).
58. Id. § 1533(a)(1). The FWS is responsible for over 95 percent of listed species.
General Accounting Office, Rep. No. GAO/RCED-92-131BR, Endangered Species Act:
Types and Number of Implementing Actions 19 (1992) [hereinafter GAO Report]. For
convenience, "Secretary" and "FWS" are used throughout the remainder of this Article,
even when referring to duties shared with the Secretary of Commerce or NMFS.
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case, status determinations must be based solely on evidence from the
"best scientific and commercial data available." 59 Listing threatened
and endangered species is a complex process, involving biological evaluations, informal agency rule'making, and public comment periods.
When necessary, the Secretary may bypass these procedures and make
60
an "emergency listing" of a species.
Concurrent with listing, the Secretary is to designate "critical
habitat" for each species.6 1 A species' critical habitat is the geographical areas "essential to the conservation of the species and ... which
may require special management considerations or protection." 62 A
species need not occupy an area for it to be considered critical habitat,
as long as the area is in some way essential to the species' viability. In
contrast to listing decisions, which must be made absent economic considerations, section 4 allows the Secretary to exclude an area from critical habitat designation if the costs 6of
designation (to society or the
3
species itself) outweigh the benefits.
Section 4 also directs the Secretary to develop and implement
"recovery plans" for listed species. 64 Recovery plans identify measures
that will resolve threats to the species, the time and costs associated
with those measures, and objective criteria to determine when the
species has sufficiently recovered to be delisted. 65 To help prepare and
implement recovery plans, the Secretary may enlist the assistance of
knowledgeable persons from public and private agencies and institutions.6 6 Recovery plans are subject to public review and comment be67
fore becoming final.
Once a species is officially listed as endangered or threatened,
the ESA confers several levels of protection. Under section 9 of the ESA,
no person 68 may "take" any endangered animal species, 69 where "take"
59. 16 U.S.C. § 1533(b)(1)(A). Congress added "solely" in 1982 to "remove from the
process of the listing or delisting of species any factor not related to the biological status
of the species ....
[Elconomic considerations have no relevance to determinations
regarding the status of species.... H.R. Rep. No. 567,97th Cong., 2d Sess. 20, reprinted
in 1982 U.S.C.C.A.N. 2,820.

60. 16 U.S.C. § 1533(b)(7).
61. Id. § 1533(a)(3)(A).
62. Id. § 1532(5)(A).
63. Id. § 1533(b)(2).
64. Id. § 1533(0(1).
65. Id. § 1533(f)(1)(B).
66. Id. § 1533(0(5).
67. Id. § 1533(0(4).
68. Since 1988 amendments to the ESA, "person" includes any "individual, corporation,
partnership, trust, association, or any other private entity; or any officer, employee, agent,
department, or instrumentality of the Federal Government, of any State, municipality,
or political subdivision of a State, or of any federal government; any State, municipality,
or political subdivision of a State; or any other entity subject to the jurisdiction of the

United States." Endangered Species Act Amendments of 1988, Pub. L. No. 100-478, §
1001(a), 100 Stat. 2306, 16 U.S.C. § 1532(13) (1988). Congress adopted this expansive
definition in response to United States v. City of Rancho Palos Verdes, 841 F.2d 329 (9th
Cir. 1988) (holding that defendant municipality was not a person for purposes of the
ESA).
69. 16 U.S.C. § 1538(a)(1)(B),(C).
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means "to harass, harm, pursue, hunt, shoot, wound, kill, trap, capture, or collect, or to attempt to engage in any such conduct."7 0 Section 9 forbids actions which "maliciously damage or destroy" endangered
plants on federal lands 71 and prohibits the import, export, interstate
72
and foreign commerce, and possession of listed species, whether plant
or animal. 73 Threatened species do not receive protection from taking
automatically, but the Secretary may make any portion or all of sec74
tion 9 applicable as required for their conservation.
Section 7 directs all federal agencies to further the purposes of
the ESA. 75 Part of this commitment includes insuring "that any action
authorized, funded, or carried out by [a federal agency] is not likely
to jeopardize the continued existence" of any listed species.76 Furthermore, agency actions may not destroy or adversely modify critical
habitat.77 Before commencing an action that may affect a listed species,
an agency must consult with the Secretary 78 and provide a "biological
assessment" of the potential impacts of the action. 79 If, in the Secretary's judgment, the proposed action jeopardizes a listed species or its
critical habitat, the Secretary may suggest "reasonable and prudent alternatives" to mitigate the action's deleterious consequences. 80 The
Secretary can grant a permit authorizing the agency to take a specified
number of the listed species, as long as the taking is consistent with a
81
reasonable and prudent alternative.
In rare instances, an action prohibited under section 7 has no
feasible alternatives and is of such considerable economic or social import to warrant special attention. For these unique cases, section 7 es70. Id. § 1532(19).

71. Id. § 1538(a)(2)(B).
72. Id. § 1538(a)(2)(A)-(D).
73. Id. § 1538(a)(1)(A),(D),(E),(F).
74. Id. § 1533(d). Under this provision, the Secretary must regulate takings and other

activities that are inconsistent with a threatened species' conservation. A federal court
has held that FWS regulations extending endangered species taking protections to
threatened species are a reasonable interpretation of the ESA. Sweet Home Chapter of
Communities v. Interior Department, 1 F.3d I (D.C. Cir. 1993). Cf. Sierra Club v. Clark,
755 F.2d 608 (8th Cir. 1985) (holding that the Secretary cannot issue regulations allowing
the taking of threatened species absent a showing of extraordinary population pressures
on its ecosystem).
75. 16 U.S.C. § 1536(a)(1).
76. Id. § 1536(a)(2).

77. Id.
78. Id.
79. Id. § 1536(c).
80. Id. § 1536(b)(3)(A). Section 7 does not give the Secretary "a veto over the actions
of other federal agencies." National Wildlife Federation v. Coleman, 529 F.2d 359 (5th
Cir.), cert. denied sub nona. Boteler v. National Wildlife Federation, 429 U.S. 979 (1976).
However, agencies that proceed with actions counter to reasonable and prudent alternatives

may face lawsuits for section 7 violations.
81. 16 U.S.C. § 1536(4).
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tablishes a special Endangered Species Committee made up of highranking governmental officials to assess the project's merits. 82 If the
Committee concludes that the economic and social benefits of the proposed action outweigh costs to listed species, it may exempt the action
from provisions of the ESA, regardless of the implications for listed
83
species.
State and private parties may also obtain take permits. A party
contemplating a project that might harm a listed species must prepare
a "[habitat] conservation plan" ("HCP") under section 10 to apply for
the permit and avoid possible ESA sanctions. 84 An HCP details probable impacts and mitigation measures for the proposed taking and jus85
tifies selection of the proposed action over less deleterious alternatives.
After a public review period, the Secretary may approve the HCP and
issue an incidental take permit for the project. 86 The permit becomes
revocable if the plan is violated or if warranted for protection of a listed
87
species.
Substantial penalties encourage compliance with ESA provisions.
Section 11 provides for up to $25,000 in civil penalties and $50,000 in
criminal penalties for each "knowing" violation of the ESA. 88 Sanctions may include fines, prison sentences, forfeitures of property, and
revocations of leases, licenses, and permits.89 Proof that defendants acted
to protect themselves or others from bodily harm in taking a listed species
90
represents an affirmative defense against charges of ESA violations.
91
In addition to the Secretary's enforcement powers, a citizen suit provision allows any person to compel private and federal compliance with
the ESA. 92 The ESA encourages citizen suits, authorizing courts to
82. Id. § 1536(e). The members of the Committee are the Secretaries of the Interior,
Agriculture, and the Army; the Administrators of the Environmental Protection Agency
and the National Oceanic and Atmospheric Administration; the Chairman of the Council

of Economic Advisors; and Presidential appointees from affected states. Id. § 1536(e)(3).
83. Id. § 1536(h). This power to decide the fate of species has led observers to
commonly refer to the Endangered Species Committee as the "God Committee" or "God

Squad."
84. Id. § 1539(a). Section 10 also allows the Secretary to permit takings for scientific
purposes and for studies to enhance recovery of listed species without completion of an

HCP. Id. § 1539(a)(1)(A).
85. Id. § 1539(a)(2)(A).
86. Id. § 1539(a)(2)(B).
87. Id. § 1539(a)(2)(C).
88. Id. § 1540(a),(b). The courts have found that Congress used "knowing" to infer
general intent to perform the prohibited action, rather than specific intent to violate the
ESA. United States v. St. Onge, 676 F. Supp. 1044 (D. Mont. 1988). See also United States
v. Billie, 667 F. Supp. 1485 (S.D. Fla. 1987).
89. 16 U.S.C. § 1540(a),(b),(d),(e).
90. Id. § 1540(a)(3),(b)(3).
91. Id. § 1540(e)(1).
92. Id. § 1540(g). However, a recent Supreme Court decision restricts the ability of
private citizens to establish standing under the ESA. See infra note 224.
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fees and other costs of litigation to any party, as apaward attorney
93
propriate.
Several other substantive sections implement additional conservation measures to further ESA goals. Section 5 authorizes land acquisition as an appropriate means to conserve listed species. 94 Section
6 mandates that the Secretary enter into cooperative agreements with
states and offer funding assistance to states that have species conservation programs consistent with ESA purposes. 95 Section 6 also includes a sovereignty clause affirming that the ESA overrides state laws
in conflict with its provisions. 96 Sections 8 and 8A authorize the Secretary to help establish international species protection programs and
international treaties on endangered species conservato implement
tion. 97
The ESA addresses a wide variety of species preservation problems and offers an equally wide variety of solutions. Twenty years ago,
the ESA moved through both houses of Congress with virtually no opposition, passing the Senate unanimously and losing only 12 votes in
the House. 98 When President Nixon signed the ESA into law, environmentalists hailed it as the turning point in society's relationship
with nature. 99 Yet few people could have predicted the power and
reach of this single statute. 10 0 It took the plight of an obscure fish, the
now infamous snail darter, to reveal what species preservation under
the ESA really entailed.
THE ENDANGERED SPECIES ACT: KEY ISSUES
In 1978, the Supreme Court permanently enjoined construction
of the Tellico Dam, a nearly complete $100-million water project in Tennessee. 10 1 Completion of the government-sponsored project would have
destroyed the remaining habitat of the only known population of an
endangered perch, the snail darter. Holding that federal participation
in eradication of the snail darter would violate section 7 of the ESA,
4
93. 16 U.S.C. § 1540(g)( ).
94. Id. § 1534.

95. Id. § 1535.
96. Id. § 1535(f).
97. Id. §§ 1537, 1537A.
98. S.Yaffee, Prohibitive Policy: Implementing the Federal Endangered Species Act

55-56 (1982).
99. See, e.g., L. Greenwalt, The Power and Potential of the Act, in Balancing on the Brink
of Extinction: The Endangered Species Act and Lessons for the Future 31, 31 (K. Kohm
ed., 1991).
100. See, e.g., Rohlf, supra note 49, at 25 (noting the possibility that "legislators were
swept up in the environmental movement of the time and enacted broad legislation without
actually considering its 'real world' impact").
101. Tennessee Valley Authority v. Hill, 437 U.S. 153 (1978).
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the Court found that "the plain intent of Congress in enacting this
statute was to halt and reverse the trend toward species extinction, whatever the cost." 102 Consistent with this interpretation, the Hill majority
suspended the multi-million project for the sake of "a relatively small
the ESA as a powerful tool
number of three-inch fish,"10 3 establishing 104
in the preservation of endangered species.
Opponents of a staunchly preservation-oriented interpretation
of the ESA believe that Hill went too far, setting precedence that allows
the ESA to unduly burden economic activity.10 5 Denouncing massive
efforts to protect "organisms that most people wouldn't hesitate to step
on," 106 opponents insist that animal and plant species, even those in
danger of extinction, should not arbitrarily be valued higher than the
needs of humans. Some ESA critics suggest that environmentalists are
economic development than with promore concerned with 1thwarting
07
tecting listed species.
Proponents of preservation insist that the importance of preventing species extinction far outweighs many of society's economic
interests. 10 8 As justification for the ESA, Congress itself declared that
"species of fish, wildlife, and plants are of esthetic, ecological, educational, historical, recreational, and scientific value .... -109 Some preservationists point out that ESA exceptions and exemption processes allow
102. Id. at 184 (emphasis added).
103. Id. at 172.
104. Although Congress reluctantly authorized completion of the dam notwithstanding
the provisions of the ESA in 1979, Hill stands as the landmark decision advancing species
preservation in the United States. D. Favre, Wildlife Law 7-13 (1991). See also Z. Plater,
In the Wake of the Snail Darter:An Environmental Law Paradigm and Its Consequences, 19 U.
Mich. J.L. Ref. 805 (1986) (citing cases that have followed Hill precedence to enforce ESA
provisions).
105. Congressional ESA reauthorization hearings following Hill are replete with
statements to this effect. See, e.g., Amending the Endangered Species Act of 1973: Hearings
on S.2899 Before the Subcomm. on Resource Protectionof the Senate Comm. on Environment
and Public Works, 95th Cong., 2d Sess. 18-19,149 (1978) (statement of Ival Goslin, Director,
Upper Colorado River Commission) ("It appears ridiculous to the point of perversity,
and completely unreasonable to believe that the human race-especially Americanswould permit a system to exist in which a snail darter in Tennessee becomes more
important than the enhancement of man's welfare.") See also Hill, supra note 101, at 196
(J.
Powell, dissenting) ("In my view § 7 cannot reasonably be interpreted as applying to
a project that is completed or substantially completed when its threat to an endangered
species is discovered. Nor can I believe that Congress could have intended this Act to
produce the 'absurd result'-in the words of the District Court-of this case.") (footnote
omitted).
106. C. Mann & M. Plummer, The Butterfly Problem: GovernmentalProtectionof Endangered
Species, 296 The Atlantic Monthly 47, 47 (Jan. 1992).
107. See, e.g., J. Heissenbuttel & W. Murray, A Troubled Law in Need of Revision, 90 J.
Forestry 13, 13 (Aug. 1992) (alleging that because the ESA is "the most severe and least
flexible of all environmental laws... [it) has supplanted other statutes as the favorite
weapon for mounting administrative and judicial attacks on legitimate economic
enterprise").
108. See generally supra part I.
109. 16 U.S.C. § 1531(a)(3).
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economically critical projects to move forward, citing the small number of projects the ESA has actually halted.11 0 Other ESA advocates
concede that the ESA is a tough law, but111one that is "befitting of the
tough problems it was written to solve."
Species preservation measures that inhibit economic activity
kindle heated arguments that threaten ESA integrity. The Hill decision,
for example, led to ESA amendments creating the Endangered Species
Committee to grant exemptions from section 7 preservation requirements. 112 More recently, a powerful consortium of astrophysical researchers (including the University of Arizona and Smithsonian
Institution) successfully lobbied Congress to exempt construction of a
multi-million-dolla'r observatory from ESA requirements, even though
it would destroy several acres of the remaining habitat of the endangered Mount Graham red squirrel. 11 3 Such amendments and special
exemptions weaken the 1effect
of the Hill interpretation that the ESA
"admits of no exception" 1 4 to the protection of listed species and their
habitat.
Congress is again debating ESA reauthorization.115 Pressure
to make the ESA more amenable to economic activity and other concerns will shape the upcoming reauthorization debate. If species preservation remains the paramount objective of the ESA, the ever-growing
list of protected species will further stall economic activity and anger
political constituencies. On the other hand, if the ESA is amended to
further accommodate economic activity, society may have effectively
decided to allow more species to go extinct.
110. See, e.g., Barry, Harroun & Halvorson, infra note 214 and accompanying text.
"Considering how many species have been protected for [nearly two decades under the
ESA], what is truly remarkable about the Endangered Species Act, therefore, is not how
many major conflicts it has spawned, but how few." M. Bean, Issues and Controversiesin
the ForthcomingReauthorization Battle, 9 Endangered Species Update 3 (Nov./Dec. 1991).
111. F. Hunt & W. Irvin, A Tough Law to Solve Tough Problems, 90 J. Forestry 17, 17
(Aug. 1992).
112. Endangered Species Act Amendments of 1978, Pub. L. No. 95-632, § 7(e)-(g), 92

Stat. 3751, 3753-57, 16 U.S.C. § 1536(e)-(g). Allaying fears that the Endangered Species
Committee would wreak havoc on species protection under the ESA, the Committee has
convened only twice since its creation in 1978, hearing a total of three cases. In its first
meeting, the Committee unanimously declined the Tellico Dam exemption request and
exempted construction of a dam that threatened critical habitat of the endangered
whooping crane. J. des Rosiers, Note, The Exemption Process under the EndangeredSpecies
Act: How the "God Squad" Works and Why, 66 Notre Dame L. Rev. 825,845-47 (1991). More

recently, the Committee exempted timber sales on 1,700 acres of spotted owl habitat,
upholding protection of another 2,700 acres. J. O'Laughlin, ESA: What the Law Is and

What It Might Become, 90 J. Forestry 6, 11 (Aug. 1992).
113. Congress also excused the project from National Environmental Policy Act

requirements. Sher & Hunting, supra note 9, at 448-52. See also L. Carlough, Endangered
Species Act, 22 Envtl. L. 1169 (1992). Similar riders' have attempted to derail the spotted
owl controversy. See Foley, supra note 7, at 274-81.

114 Hill, supra note 101, at 173.
115. See supra note 13.
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The remainder of this Article addresses major areas of contention over the ESA and its implementation. The first section looks at
funding problems that hamper ESA implementation and enforcement
activities. The next section discusses issues concerning measures that
form the basis for species preservation under the ESA: listing, critical
habitat designation, and recovery.plans. Subsequent sections analyze
controversies involving listed species protection in both public and private domains. The final section addresses problems underlying administrative and legal approaches to species preservation and discusses
ways the law could incorporate wildlife management concepts to more
efficiently and effectively protect endangered species.
A. Funding Species Preservationunder the ESA
Effective ESA administration depends on funding adequate to
staff and implement conservation efforts, to police and prosecute violators, and to purchase habitat for listed species. Resources necessary
for these programs greatly exceed availability. For instance, full recovery of all species listed and warranting listing may cost close to $4.6
billion dollars. 116 Perhaps a minimum of $300 million annually, an
amount equivalent to federal expenditures on conservation programs
for game wildlife, would be required for the success of conservation
117
programs aimed at recovering threatened and endangered species.
Compared to budgets for game conservation, however, amounts Congress has authorized to implement the ESA have not been large. For
of up to only
fiscal years 1988-1992, Congress authorized appropriations
118
responsibilities.
ESA
fulfill
to
annually
million
$41.5
New listings, which proceed at a pace slow enough to inspire
lawsuits 119 yet manage to substantially outpace budget increases, further strain ESA programs. Funding for the ESA increased only three
percent in constant dollars during the Reagan administration, despite
the listing of an additional 237 species, a 30 percent increase in the number of listed species. 120 Also, budget allocations frustrate ESA imple116. Office of Inspector General, Dep't of the Interior, Audit Report No. 90-98, The
Endangered Species Program of the U.S. Fish and Wildlife Service 11 (1990) [hereinafter
Inspector General Report]. This figure probably overestimates the actual costs of recovery,
because it extrapolates from the expense of recovering mostly animal species, whereas
the majority of species warranting listing are actually plants, which require substantially
less resources. Nevertheless, the $4.6 billion dollar estimate emphasizes that the cost of
effectively implementing ESA programs is much larger than current appropriations. Bean,
supra note 110, at 2-3.
117. Id. at 3.
118. 16 U.S.C. § 1542(a)(1). "In 1991 the Fish and Wildlife Service received the largest
annual appropriation it [had] ever received to administer the Act-$38.7 million ... less
than the amount budgeted for repairs of the Woodrow Wilson Bridge." Bean, supra note

110, at 1.
119. See supra note 92; infra note 150.
120. K. Barton, Federal Fish and Wildlife Agency Budgets, in The Audubon Wildlife
Report 321, 336 (R. Di Silvestro ed., 1987).
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mentation. Less than half the FWS's operating budget is earmarked for
ESA programs, and during the 1980s allocations for other FWS programs increased more rapidly than money directed at implementation
and enforcement of the ESA. 121 Throughout the Reagan and Bush administrations, appropriation requests for ESA land acquisition and cooperative programs were minimal
to nonexistent, mirroring meager
122
congressional authorizations.
Inadequate funding hampers all aspects of the ESA program.
The Office of Technology Assessment reported to Congress that the
FWS was "severely underfunded" and "not fully effective in achieving [its] objectives because of inadequate funding." 123 Another authority characterized the FWS as an agency that "muddles through"
its duties as a result of resources inadequate to carry out its legislative
mandates. 124 Often, insufficient funding prevents the FWS from competently managing ESA programs and gathering even the most basic
information on listed species. 125 The Interior's Inspector General found
ESA programs "so mismanaged that hundreds of threatened species
126
face extinction without any Federal effort to save them."
Problems with section 6's cooperative programs between the
FWS and the states exemplify the FWS's inability to fulfill its mandate.
Through cooperative agreements, state wildlife agencies play an important role in ESA implementation. Most state agencies are well
equipped to manage endangered species concerns on the local level
and can provide much of the needed personnel and facilities. 127 "Inadequate and inconsistent" funding for cooperative conservation plans,
however, discourages states from entering into agreements with the
FWS.128 As a result of the lack of federal funding for these plans, many
121. F. Campbell, The Appropriations History, in Balancing on the Brink of Extinction:
The Endangered Species Act and Lessons for the Future 134, 144 (K. Kohm ed., 1991).
122. Under the Reagan administration, five out of seven budgets failed to request
funds for cooperative programs with the states. J. Ernst, Federalismand the Act, in Balancing
on the Brink of Extinction: The Endangered Species Act and Lessons for the Future 98,
102 (K. Kohm ed., 1991). Land acquisitions were "funded by Congress largely over
administrative objections." Campbell, supra note 121, at 135-36.
123. OTA Report, supra note 1, at 18.
124. J. Nienaber-Clarke & D. McCool, Staking Out the Terrain: Power Differentials
among Natural Resource Management Agencies 77-91 (1985).
125. See, e.g., Fund for Animals, Inc. v. Turner, No. CIV.A.91-2201(MB), 1991 WL
206232, at *4 (D.D.C. Sept. 27, 1991) (noting that FWS lacks data sufficient to determine
whether the grizzly bear population is declining, stationary, or increasing).
126. P. Shenon, Agency's Flaws Linked to Loss of Some Species, N.Y. Times, Oct. 18,1990,
at A18.
127. "The successful development of an endangered species program will ultimately
depend upon a good working arrangement between the federal agencies, which have
broad policy perspective and authority, and the state agencies, which have the physical
facilities and the personnel to see that state and federal endangered species policies are
properly executed. The grant program authorized by this legislation is essential to an
adequate program .... " Ernst, supra note 122, at 101.
128. Id. at 102.
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states have cut back or eliminated endangered species research and re129
covery projects.
Increasing funding to implement and enforce the ESA could
help solve many problems with ESA programs, and moderate increases
in the FWS budget for implementing and enforcing the ESA have received some support in Congress 30 Some ESA opponents claim that
the FWS seeks more funds only to increase the size of its bureaucracy,
contending that FWS ineffectiveness in recovering and delisting species
should not be perpetuated, let alone rewarded.1 3 1 ESA proponents
counter that the national import of endangered species protection warrants an increased FWS budget that realistically matches the difficult
132
task of recovering hundreds of threatened and endangered species.
The current national deficit situation and administrative budget cuts,
however, make large increases in ESA budgets less likely. In light of
these constraints, redistributing the overall FWS budget in favor of ESA
programs deserves serious consideration.
B. StartingSpecies on the Road to Recovery
The Listing Process
Listing is the mechanism through which the FWS identifies
threatened and endangered species to be protected under the ESA. Section 4 allows the Secretary to list a species for any one of several reasons: 1) because the species' habitat has been or might be destroyed or
modified; 2) because the species has been over-used; 3) because of disease or predation; 4) because of inadequate regulatory mechanisms; or
5) because of other natural or human-caused factors. 133 Despite this
broad mandate, many species warranting ESA protection go unlisted
because the listing process is prohibitively cumbersome and expensive.
Most species proposed for listing lack the substantial evidence necessary to establish their threatened or endangered status. The FWS esti129. Id. at 102-03.
130. A bill introduced in the House of Representatives in 1991 would have increased
funding authorizations for conservation efforts by approximately 10 percent plus inflation
per year. By FY 1997, it authorized $100 million for ESA administration. H.R. 4045, 102d
Cong., Ist Sess. (1991). Also, as part of its economic stimulus package, the Clinton
administration requested a $14 million (35 percent) increase in the FWS's ESA budget.
J. Cohen, Defenders of Biodiversity, Nat'l J. Gov't Exec., Apr. 1993, available in LEXIS, Exec
Library, Govexec File.
131. See, e.g., 138 Cong. Rec. H6374, H6410 (daily ed. July 22, 1992) (statement of
Rep. Rod Chandler (R-WA)) (" ... [The ESAJ is no longer working as intended. Of the
681 species that have been listed for protection, only 11 have been removed from the
list. Seven went extinct and four species recovered. Despite a less than 1 percent success
rate, Congress is content to dodge the real problem and throw money at the Endangered
Species Act without any meaningful debate.").
132. See generally Campbell, supra note 121.
133. 16 U.S.C. § 1533(a)(1)(A)-(E).
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mates that gathering documentation adequate to determine the status
of a single species costs, on average, $60,000.134 To review and list all
candidate species at the current rate would require an estimated 50
years and $114 million. 135 Furthermore, each new listing proposal
stimulates political backlash against the ESA. Because of a fear that a
listed species will halt development, landowners frequently oppose
the listing of species on their property1 36 Although the magnitude of
this fear may be unwarranted, 137 pressure from development groups
has delayed the listing process and resulted in listing priorities that
conflict with the ESA requirement that science alone should determine
138
whether a species is in danger of extinction.
Judicial review and statutory language dictate that listing should
be based solely on science.1 39 A federal district court held that the
FWS's refusal to list the spotted owl was "arbitrary and capricious and
contrary to law" and lacked scientific credibility, considering that all
expert opinion indicated the owl was in danger.1 40 The court emphasized that the listing of a species must be "based solely on an evaluation of the biological risks faced by the species, to the exclusion of all
other factors."141 The General Accounting Office subsequently determined that the FWS had succumbed to political pressure and "substantively changed the body of scientific evidence presented in the [owl's]
status report ...changing the report from one that emphasized the
dangers facing the owl to one that could more easily support denying
the listing petition." 142 Although the court's decision ordering the FWS
to list the spotted owl is precedence for future cases involving unsubstantiated listing decisions, most species lack constituencies powerful
enough to challenge nonlisting in court.
Delays resulting from insufficient funding and political pressure on the listing process have created a massive backlog of species
that likely would meet listing requirements. Although approximately
134. Inspector General Report, supra note 116, at 7.
135. Id.
136. See, e.g., City of Las Vegas v. Lujan, 891 F.2d 927, 929 (D.C. Cir. 1989)
(appellants/developers alleging that an emergency listing of the desert tortoise would
bring construction activity in southern Nevada to a standstill).
137. "The listing of the desert tortoise certainly hasn't stopped development in Las
Vegas and surrounding Clark County, Nevada. Nor did the listing of the Coachella Valley
fringe-toed lizard halt all development in burgeoning Palm Springs. Together, Hawaii

and Florida harbor more than 180 listed species, more than a quarter of the total.
Nevertheless, development there continues apace." Bean, supra note 110, at 4.
138. Yaffee, supra note 98, at 87-91.
139. See supra note 59 on "solely".
140. Northern Spotted Owl v. Hodel, 716 F. Supp. 479, 483 (W.D. Wash. 1988).
141. Id. at 480 (emphasis added).
142. General Accounting Office, Rep. No. GAO/RCED-89-79, Endangered Species:
Spotted Owl Petition Evaluation Best by Problems 1 (Feb. 1989). See also T. Gup, Owl vs.
Man, Time, June 25, 1990, at 56, 63.
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550 domestic species had been listed through 1989, the Inspector General estimated that the FWS had failed to provide legal listing and protection for "an additional 600 known and 3000 probable endangered or
threatened animals and plants." 143 In an attempt to address the listing
backlog, Congress in 1979 directed the FWS to prioritize species for
listing. 144 The FWS now categorizes species under consideration for
listing ("candidate species") based on the sufficiency of data regarding the species' status. 145 Candidate species "prelists" demonstrate the
dire circumstances of the listing process. The large number of species
on the prelists are afforded little protection, and by the time the FWS
officially lists a candidate species as threatened or endangered, the
species likely has reached a situation requiring drastic, and possibly
prohibitively expensive, recovery procedures. 146 Many candidate species
may already be extinct. 147 Furthermore, prelisting may actually encourage intentional destruction of species. For instance, landowners
have purposefully eradicated candidate species and habitat on their
property so that future ESA sanctions would not hamper development.148 The 1988 ESA amendments improved the situation for prelisted
species by requiring the Secretary to monitor the status of candidate
species and make an emergency listing of a species if necessary,149 but
Congress has not increased the FWS budget to allow additional resources
for monitoring candidate species.
Absent increased funding, Congress could improve efficiency
of the listing process by reducing the documentation required to list
species. In such case, if the FWS errs in determining a species' status,
143. Inspector General Report, supra note 116, at 5. As of January 1993, 758 domestic
species had been listed. U.S. Fish & Wildlife Serv., Box Score: Listing and Recovery Plans,
17 Endangered Species Technical Bull. 20 (1992).
144. Pub. L. 96-159 § 3(6), 93 Stat. 1225, 1225-26 (1979), 16 U.S.C. § 1533(h)(3).
145. 50 C.F.R. § 424.02(b) (1991). Species are placed in "Category 1" if data indicates
that listing is warranted but precluded until higher priority species are listed, "Category
2" if conclusive biological data on the species' status are not yet available, and "Category
3" if evidence suggests that the species is already extinct or does not warrant further
listing consideration. 50 Fed. Reg. 39,526-27 (1985).
146. See, e.g., infra note 315.
147. W. Reffalt, The Endangered Species Lists: Chronicles of Extinction, in Balancing on
the Brink of Extinction: The Endangered Species Act and Lessons for the Future 77, 81
(K. Kohm ed., 1991). During the 1980s, possibly 34 Category I and Category 2 species
became extinct. Inspector General Report, supra note 116, at 7.
148. For example, a developer destroyed half of the remaining population of the
prickly-ash shortly before the species was to be officially listed as endangered. D. Wilcove
et al., What Exactly is an Endangered Species? An Analysis of the U.S. Endangered Species
List: 1985-1991, 7 Conservation Biology 87, 89 (1993). See also B. MacBryde, Why Are So
Few Endangered Plants Protected?, 59 Am. Horticulturist 29, 33 (1980) (alleging that the
FWS admits to several occasions of candidate species being deliberately destroyed on
private property).
149. Endangered Species Act Amendments of 1988, Pub. L. No. 100-478, § 1002(a),
102 Stat. 2306 (1988), 16 U.S.C. § 1533(b)(3)(C)(iii) (1988).
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it errs on the side of protecting the species. 5 0° Alternatively, Congress
could confer candidate species, particularly Category 1 species, with
a variation or subset of the protections afforded listed species. On the
other hand, mandating additional listings, easing listing requirements,
or substantially increasing the umbrella of ESA protections might
heighten concerns about potential impacts on economic activity, fostering additional political discontent with the ESA. Accelerating listing also would add expense to programs aimed at protecting species
thus recognized.
Critical Habitat
Habitat alteration and destruction are the leading causes of
species extinction.1 5 1 Congress was aware of this fact when it contemplated legislating species preservation. 152 One of the stated purposes
of the ESA, "to provide a means whereby the ecosystems upon which
endangered species and threatened species depend may be conserved," 153
links species recovery to the importance of habitat and ecosystem protection. Section 4 calls for the designation of habitat critical to a species
survival, 154 and section 7 states that federal agencies are to insure that
their actions do not "result in the destruction or adverse modification
of habitat of [a listed] species which is determined.., to be critical."15 5
The courts also have interpreted section 9's takings prohibition to include adverse modification of critical habitat. 156 Despite the importance of habitat to species survival, the FWS has not designated critical
habitat for a majority of listed species. As of 1991,
only 16 percent of
157
all listed species had designated critical habitat.
The paucity of critical habitat designations may be attributed,
at least in part, to statutory language that affords the Secretary considerable discretion in designating critical habitat. Section 4 only requires the Secretary to designate critical habitat at the time of a species'
150. As settlement of a recent suit charging that the slow pace of listing species
violated the ESA, the Secretary agreed to list some 400 candidate species over the next
four years. E. Glitzenstein, On the USFWS Settlement Regarding FederalListingof Endangered
Species, 10 Endangered Species Update I (Mar. 1993).
151. See, e.g., Ehrlich, supra note 4, at 21; Council on Environmental Quality,
Environmental Quality: Eleventh Annual Report 43 (1980).
152. Statements that habitat destruction is the leading threat to species existence are
common in the hearings on ESA authorization in 1973. See generally Endangered Species
Act: Hearingson H.R. 4758 Before the Subconmm. on Fisheriesand Wildlife Conservation and
the Environment of the House Comn. on Merchant Marine and Fisheries, 93d Cong., 1st Sess.
(1973). See also S. Rep. No. 307, 93d Cong., 1st Sess. 2 (1973), reprintedin 1973 U.S.C.C.A.N.
2989, 2990.
153. 16 U.S.C. § 1531(b).
154. Id. § 1533(a)(3)(A).

155. Id. § 1536(a)(2).
156. See infra part III.D.
157. GAO Report, supra note 58, at 29.
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listing "to the maximum extent prudent and determinable." 158 Although
Congress intended this provision to be exercised sparingly,' 59 the FWS
has opted to invoke it with regularity. One examination of the Federal
Register from 1980-1988 revealed that the FWS declined to list habitat
for 320 species, stating in 317 of those cases that designating critical
habitat would not be "prudent," commonly because designation would
seriously increase vandalism or collection of the listed species? 60 Even
when designated, critical habitat does not always encompass areas necessary for a species' recovery. The ESA requires the FWS to consider
"the economic impact, and any other relevant impact, of specifying any
particular area as critical habitat." 161 The FWS has frequently invoked
this clause to excise from critical habitat162
designations areas that are
otherwise important for species recovery.
Delays and omissions in designating areas as critical habitat
stem largely from two sources. First, a finding that a designation is not
prudent allows the Secretary to avoid meeting complex designation requirements. The ESA requires the FWS to couple critical habitat designation with an evaluation of all activities that might be restricted or
curtailed by designation, as well as activities that might adversely modify designated areas. 163 Such an analysis is expensive and time consuming, and the FWS is ill-equipped to handle the task. Secondly, as
in the listing process, the FWS often experiences considerable public
pressure not to designate critical habitat for a listed species. This opposition is rooted in the perception that the ESA forbids all activities
in designated critical habitat areas.1 64 Federal agencies and private in158. 16 U.S.C. § 1533(a)(3).
159. See, e.g., Endangered Species Act Amendments of 1978: House Report on Merchant
Marine and Fisheries Comm., 95th Cong., 2d Sess. 17 (1978) ("The committee intends
that in most situations the Secretary will, in fact, designate critical habitat at the same
time that a species is listed as either endangered or threatened. It is in only rare
circumstances where the specification of critical habitat concurrently with the listing
would not be beneficial to the species.") (emphasis added).
160. J. Salzman, Evolution and Application of Critical Habitat under the Endangered
Species Act, 14 Harv. Envtl. L. Rev. 311, 332-33 (1990). In other forums the FWS admitted
that collecting and vandalism were not the leading causes of species decline. Id. at 33435. The trend toward avoiding critical habitat designation has continued. 0. Houck, The
Endangered Species Act and Its Implementation by the U.S. Departments of Interior and
Commerce, 64 U. Colo.L. Rev. 277, 303 (1993) (noting that from Dec. 1988 through May,
1992, 174 of 200 notices for listing declined to designate critical habitat).
161. 16 U.S.C. § 1533(b)(2).
162. D. Rohlf, Six Biological Reasons Why the EndangeredSpecies Act Doesn't WorkAnd What to Do about It, 5 Conservation Biology 273, 278 (1991).
163. 16 U.S.C. § 1533(b)(2), 50 C.F.R. § 424.14 (1990). See J. Kilbourne, The Endangered
Species Act under the Microscope; A Closeup Look from a Litigator's Perspective, 21 Envtl. L.
499, 510-11 (1991).
164. See, e.g., G.Coggins, Endangeredand Threatened Wildlife and Plant Species Preservation,
in Public Natural Resources Law Release No. 3, 15-26, 15-48 (1992) (labeling designated
critical habitat "super-wilderness" because it is off-limits to almost all human activities).
However, the FWS has stated that designated critical "does not create a wildlife refuge
or wilderness area, nor does it close the area to human activity. U.S. Department of the
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vestors are often unwilling to commit resources toward a project that
might be halted by the presence of critical habitat. 165 Developers dependent on these investors are thus encouraged to mount campaigns
directed at stalling or preventing critical habitat designation.
Although fear of economic and political repercussions may
cause FWS reluctance to designate critical habitat, a recent court decision may force the agency to act otherwise. In Northern Spotted Owl v.
Lujan, the court ordered the FWS to list critical habitat for the spotted
owl, holding that the FWS abused its discretion by not explaining its
reasons for determining that designating critical habitat for the owl
166
was not determinable.
Congress could improve the efficiency of critical habitat designations in a variety of ways. Removing the requirement to incorporate economic considerations would ease the FWS's burden during the
critical habitat designation process. 167 FWS interpretation and implementation of section 4's "prudent and determinable" clause contradicts the ESA's emphasis on critical habitat designation and protection.
Rewording "to the maximum extent prudent and determinable" to
"unless such designation significantly increases the jeopardy of a listed
species" might help eliminate the FWS's reliance on "not prudent" as
an excuse for refusing to designate critical habitat. Only legitimate threats
of vandalism or illegal collection should allow external considerations
to prevent designation. 168 Critical habitat designations that unacceptably affect economic activity could be mitigated through compensa169
tion programs, although such funding is currently in short supply.
Controversy surrounding delays in the critical habitat designation process is further complicated by the possibility that designated
critical habitat is legally redundant, and therefore of little benefit to
species conservation. Legal scholars argue that because the ESA defines critical habitat as areas "essential to the conservation of the
species," 170 adverse modification of critical habitat also will necessarInterior, Fish & Wildlife Serv., Placing Animals and Plants on the List of Endangered
and Threatened Species 5.
165. Salzman, supra note 160, at 319-20.
166. 758 F. Supp. at 628.
167. See, e.g., Foley, supra note 7, at 274 (noting that "consideration of economic factors
[in the designation of critical habitat) is contrary to the very purpose and structure of
the ESA...
168. According to FWS guidelines on when critical habitat designation may not be
prudent, vandalism and collecting are "obvious threats to such species such as cacti,
carnivorous plants, falcons, collectable butterflies, other attractive or traded wildlife,
other horticulturally desirable plants, or species that are low in numbers, easily accessible,
or subject to public hostility or curiosity." U.S. Fish and Wildlife Service, Endangered
Species Listing Handbook 88 (1989).
169. See, e.g., Salzman, supra note 160, at 340-41.
170. 16 U.S.C. § 1532(5)(A)(i).
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ily jeopardize that species' chances for recovery and survival. 171 Section 7's mandate that federal agencies must not destroy or adversely
modify critical habitat therefore may essentially duplicate the section
7 requirement that agencies must not jeopardize a species' continued
existence. 17 2 Furthermore, harm to a species' critical habitat likely
could constitute a violation of section 9's taking prohibitions, whether
that habitat is designated critical or not. Despite these potential shortcomings, courts are more likely to find section 7 and section 9 violations if challenged activities occur within designated critical habitat. 173
Recovery Plans
A central goal of the ESA is to recover species to the point at
which they no longer require legal protection. To encourage the Secretary to accomplish this objective, section 4 mandates preparation of "recovery plans" for listed species.1 74 A recovery plan outlines
responsibilities and management roles of all governmental agencies and
other parties with jurisdiction over the species and its habitat, but does
not require inclusion of economic analyses. In preparing and implementing recovery plans, the Secretary may enlist knowledgeable persons from public and private agencies and institutions, including
academicians. 17S The mandate to prepare recovery plans is not absolute,
a plan that
however, and the Secretary may choose to forego preparing
"will not promote the conservation of the species." 176
The FWS has failed to complete recovery plans for a number of
listed species. Through November 1992, over 45 percent of listed species
did not have approved recovery plans in place.17 7 For the majority of
species with approved recoveryplans, approval of the plan comes more
than three years after listing.1 78 Further, an approved recovery plan
does not ensure implementation. Recovery plans are advisory documents to the Secretary and not binding agreements, meaning the Sec171. Bean, supra note 46, at 339.
172. See, e.g., Rohlf, supra note 49, at 152 (noting that FWS regulations on adverse
modification of critical habitat are virtually identical to the regulatory definition of
jeopardy and therefore add nothing to section 7's substantive protection). See also Salzman,
supra note 160, at 326-27. Some authors claim these regulations are illegal. See, e.g., infra
note 201.
173. See Salzman, supra note 160, at 324-27 (citing cases where findings of section 7
jeopardy violations turned on whether critical habitat had been designated); Palla v.
Hawaii Dept. of Land and Natural Resources, 639 F.2d 495 (9th Cir. 1981) (holding that
damage to critical habitat constituted a section 9 taking, even absent federal involvement).

But see infra note 240 and accompanying text.
174.
175.
176.
177.
178.

16 U.S.C. § 1533(f).
Id. § 1533(0(2).
Id. § 1533(0(1).
U.S. Fish & Wildlife Serv., supra note 143, at 20.
GAO Report, supra note 58, at 35.
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retary has considerable discretion in implementing them. 179 One obthan half of the existing plans were being
server estimated that less
18 0
implemented faithfully.
In addition to delays and problems with implementation and
development, the recovery program suffers from plans that are flawed
from biological or other standpoints. 181 For example, one author has
criticized the recovery plan for Northern Rocky Mountain wolf for focusing on potential social and economic impacts as key decisional elements in recovering the wolf. 182 The wolf plan allows individual
wolves to be "killed to protect the economic interests of ranchers," thereby
according economics a dominant role.183 The author contends that seeking to placate the livestock industry with an economically sensitive rethat "under the ESA economics
covery plan violates a basic principle
184
remains secondary to biology."
Despite this apt criticism of the wolf plan, consideration of economic and other political interests make recovery plan implementation more likely. Failing to adequately address the economic impacts
of recovery may delay, hinder, or prevent implementation because of
staunch resistance from parties that the plan affects. Perhaps the greatest weakness in the recovery planning process is the lack of a political
feasibility analysis in most recovery plans.18 5 Success of a recovery plan
may depend on how well approaches to recovery integrate different
education proobjectives of various interests the plan affects. 186 Public
18 7
grams may be necessary to enlist public support.
Congress should address delays in recovery plan development,
problems in implementation, and emphasis on issues other than species
preservation. Some commentators suggest adding a statutory deadline
for recovery plan completion within a limited time after listing.188 Strict
179. OTA Report, supra note 1, at 28. See also National Wildlife Fed'n v. National Park
Serv., 669 F. Supp. 384 (D. Wyo. 1987) (finding that Secretary is not obligated to initiate
a plan that will not promote the species' recovery, and may delay implementing a plan
pending additional study).
180. Campbell, supra note 121, at 141.
181. See generally R. Culbert & R. Blair, Recovery Planningand Endangered Species, 6
Endangered Species Update 2 (Aug. 1989).
182. D. Goble, Of Wolves and Welfare Ranching, 16 Harv. Envtl. L. Rev. 101, 110-12
(1992). Goble also notes that the wolf plan was not approved until 14 years after the
species was listed. Id.
183. Id. at 112.
184. Id. at 114.
185. Culbert & Blair, supra note 181, at 2. Legislation recently introduced in Congress
to reauthorize the ESA would require the Secretary to minimize recovery plans' adverse
social and economic consequences. H.R. 2043, 103d Cong., Ist Sess. (1993); S. 291, 103d
Cong., 1st Sess. (1993).
186. L. Irwin & T. Wigley, Conservationof Endangered Species: The Inpact on Private
Forestry, 90 J. Forestry 27 (Aug. 1992).
187. P. Angermeier & J.Williams, Conservation of Imperiled Species and Reauthorization
of the Endangered Species Act of 1973, 18 Fisheries 34, 36 (1993).
188. Hunt & Irvin, supra note 111, at 21.
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adherence to production schedules for recovery plans is difficult, however, because most recovery team members are academicians, recruited
for their particular expertise, who often must schedule donated recovery team work around academic responsibilities. Furthermore, institutional and disciplinary biases often result in disagreements among
recovery team members and take time to resolve. 189 Congress could
make implementation more effective by requiring that agencies failing
to follow approved plans would be in violation of the ESA. 190 Just as
federal agencies must adhere to biological opinions issued by the Secretary, Congress could require and give authority to the FWS to implement and enforce provisions of recovery plans.
C. EnlistingFederal Agencies to Help Protect Endangered Species
Domestic Federal Actions
Congress envisioned federal agencies playing a central role in
species preservation in this country. The ESA declares that "all Federal
departments and agencies shall seek to conserve endangered species
and threatened species," 19 1 mandating almost universal federal commitment to recovery of listed species. Section 7 repeats this charge, calling for all federal agencies to "utilize their authorities in furtherance
of the purposes of [the ESAJ by carrying out programs for the conservation of endangered species and threatened species listed pursuant to
[section 4J.1192 In addition to this conservation mandate, federal agencies must consult with the FWS to insure that their actions-or actions
they permit-do not "jeopardize the continued existence" of listed
species or adversely modify critical habitat. 193 The courts have held
that federal responsibilities under the ESA are affirmative duties that
must be actively pursued. 194
FWS regulations interpreting section 7's interagency cooperation requirements run counter to ESA language calling for agencies to
189. For a detailed analysis of this aspect of the recovery planning process, see T.
Clark & A. Harvey, Implementing Recovery Policy: Learning As We Go?, in Balancing on
the Brink of Extinction: The Endangered Species Act and Lessons for the Future 147 (K.
Kohm ed., 1991).
190. Angermeier & Williams, supra note 187, at 36.
191. 16 U.S.C. § 1531(c)(1). The ESA defines "conserve" as "the use of all methods
and procedures which are necessary to bring any endangered species or threatened
species to the point at which the measures provided pursuant to this chapter are no
longer necessary." Id. § 1532(3).
192. Id. § 1536(a)(1).
193. Id. § 1536(a)(2),(4). See also supra notes 75-83 and accompanying text. For an
extensive review of the consultation process, see Kilbourne, supra note 163, at 530-60.
194. National Wildlife Fed'n v. Coleman, 529 F.2d 359, 371 (5th Cir.) (finding that a
federal agency must take "all necessary action to insure that its actions will not jeopardize
the continued existence of an endangered species or destroy or modify habitat critical
to the existence of the species"), cert. denied sub non. Boteler v. National Wildlife Fed'n,
429 U.S. 979 (1976).
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protect listed species from injury and to encourage their recovery. Notably, the regulations prohibit only agency actions that diminish "the
value of critical habitat for both the survival and recovery of a listed
species." 195 The FWS has applied the conjunctive phrasing of this regulation such that an agency action must threaten the bare survival of
a species to violate the ESA. 196 An action that prevents a species' recovery but does not threaten its survival would not be restricted under
this regulation. Using this reasoning, the FWS included as part of the
critical habitat of the endangered Mount Graham red squirrel land
slated for construction of a multi-million dollar observatory 197 Because
clearing the observatory site would not appreciably diminish the overall value of habitat critical to the squirrel's existence, the FWS found
that Forest Service participation in the construction would not conflict
with section 7 regulations, even though clearing the site might well reduce the squirrel's chances of recovery.
This result and a number of cases with similar results conflict
198
with the judicial interpretation that the ESA imposes a "mandatory"
affirmative obligation on the FWS to "actively pursue a species conservation policy." 199 To satisfactorily fulfill this duty, the FWS "must
do far more than merely avoid the elimination of protected species. It
must bring these species back from the brink so that they may be removed from the protected class, and it must use all methods necessary
to do so. "2 0° Regulations that allow actions to jeopardize a species' recovery potential do not comport with this interpretation. 20 1 The FWS's
apparent dereliction of this duty likely derives in part from a need to
minimize consultation burdens, although one court implied that an unspoken policy not to hamper economic activity may motivate the
20 2
agency.
Other FWS procedures hinder public involvement in section
7's consultation process, removing an important check on the exercise
195. 50 C.F.R. § 402.02 (1991) (emphasis added).
196. Rohlf, supra note 49, at 149.
197. Kilbourne, supra note 163, at 541.
198. National Wildlife Fed'n v. Hodel, 15 Envtl. L. Rep. (Envtl. L. Inst.) 20,891, 20,893
(E.D. Cal. 1985).
199. Carson-Truckee Water Conservancy Dist. v. Clark, 741 F.2d 257, 262 (9th Cir.
1984), cert. denied sub nor. Nevada v. Hodel, 470 U.S. 1083 (1985). In fact, the Secretary
has authority to give listed species priority over other interests "until such time as they
no longer need ESA's protection." Id.
200. Defenders of Wildlife v. Andrus, 428 F. Supp. 167, 170 (D.D.C. 1977)
201. For an argument that the "survival and recovery" regulations are illegal because
they render provisions of the ESA regarding critical habitat superfluous and because
they protect listed species only when critical habitat destruction threatens species survival,
see Houck, supra note 160, at 299-301.
202. Seattle Audubon Soc'y v. Evans, 771 F. Supp. 1081, 1090 (W.D. Wash.) (finding
"a deliberate and systematic refusal by... the FWS to comply with the laws protecting
wildlife .... [that] reflects decisions made by higher authorities in the executive branch
of government"), aff'd, 952 F.2d 297 (9th Cir. 1991).
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of agency discretion. 20 3 Until 1986, section 7 regulations required that
federal agencies formally consult with the FWS on actions or projects
that might "affect" a listed species.2°4 A formal consultation results in
a written statement (a "biological opinion") of FWS findings on whether
the action would violate the ESA, including "reasonable and prudent
alternatives" to the proposed action and the basis for the FWS's opinion. The alternative to formal consultation, the less demanding informal consultation, results in no public documents explaining the FWS's
basis for decision. In 1986, the FWS changed the formal consultation
requirement to apply only to agency actions that might "adversely affect" a listed species.20 5 This simple semantic change has substantially
reduced the number of formal consultations, thereby decreasing publicly reviewable documentation accompanying section 7 biological determinations. 20 6 From 1979 through 1981, an average of 19 percent of
all interagency consultations resulted in biological opinions. 20 7 In 1986,
under the new regulations, only four percent of all consultations resulted in biological opinions. 2°8 Although reduced paperwork may
speed up the consultation process, the disproportionate number of informal consultations severely limits opportunity for public review of
agency decisions.
Public scrutiny of federal actions is important to species preservation. Congress encouraged civil suits to help enforce the ESA, granting interested parties an opportunity to challenge actions that may
violate ESA provisions. 2°9 This process has led to the overturn of several FWS decisions made with insufficient biological data. 210 Non-litigious public involvement also brings powerful pressures to bear on
federal agencies contemplating projects that might affect listed species,
encouraging ESA compliance. Reduced documentation accompanying
interagency consultations inhibits meaningful public participation integral to ESA effectiveness. On the other hand, informal consultations
represent "a much less burdensome process than formal consultations." 211 In light of the FWS's stressed ESA budget, requiring formal
consultations in all cases would be untenable. Congress could, how203. For a brief overview of the consultation process, see D. Soderberg & P. Larsen,
Triggering Section 7: Federal Land Sales and "Incidental Take" Permits, 6 J. Land Use & Envtl.
L. 169, 186-94 (1991).
204. 50 C.F.R. § 402.14 (1985).
205. 50 C.F.R. § 402.14 (1991).
206. Rohlf, supra note 162, at 277-78.
207. Id. at 277.
208. Id. From 1987 through 1991, the number of formal consultations increased to 11
percent, but remains well below the pre-1986 level. GAO Report, supra note 58, at 30.
209. See supra note 92 and accompanying text.
210. Rohlf, supra note 162, at 277.
211. GAO Report, supra note 58, at 30.
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ever, mandate that FWS publish decisions on informal interagency consultations in a less extensive official statement. All endangered species
consultations, formal and informal, would then result in a document
explaining agency findings and decisions.
FWS regulations such as those discussed above 212 and attempts
to broaden the exemption process 213 reflect a common perception that
the interagency consultation process unreasonably impedes economic
activities. Critics claim that the consultation process bogs down already
overly bureaucratic activities and prevents federal agencies from carrying out important projects. Contrary to these claims, only rarely has
the ESA actually halted agency activities. From fiscal years 1987 through
1991, for instance, over 71,560 informal and 2,000 formal FWS consultations eliminated only 18 proposed activities because of jeopardy opinions. 214 Of course, these results do not determine the ESA's full effect
on federal agency actions because they ignore the number of actions
abandoned prior to or during consultation. The statistics do suggest,
however, that irreconcilable conflicts between species preservation and
agency actions occur rarely, and indicate that endangered species protection is less burdensome on economic activity than critics claim. By
requiring the FWS to identify "reasonable and prudent" alternatives
to mitigate impacts without canceling the proposed action, 215 section
7 consultations leave room for compromise solutions that allow federal actions to proceed legally under the ESA.
Because regulations may change dramatically with each new
presidential administration, the ESA must clearly state that the agencies' mandate to conserve species includes a requirement to recover
listed species. For example, Congress could reword the ESA to explicitly prohibit activities and agency decisions that affect a species' chances
of recovery, not simply survival, and implementation of recovery plans
should be mandatory as discussed above. Finally, to achieve species
recovery, Congress should appropriate additional funds in the FWS
budget, and in the budgets of other federal agencies, explicitly earmarked for developing and implementing recovery programs.
Federal Actions Abroad
The problem of species extinction extends well beyond the borders of the United States. Recognizing this, Congress stated a "com212. The FWS also has promulgated regulations that exempt mandatory agency
actions from section 7 compliance, further easing consultation requirements. Kilbourne,
supra note 163, at 529.
213. See des Rosiers, supra note 112, at 829.
214. D. Barry, L. Harroun & C. Halvorson, ForConserving Listed Species, Talk Is Cheaper
than We Think: The ConsultationProcess Under the Endangered Species Act, World Wildlife

Fund (Feb. 1992).
215. 16 U.S.C. § 1536(b)(3)(A).
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mitment of the United States to the worldwide protection of endangered and threatened species" 216 and outfitted the ESA with far-reaching international application. For example, the ESA is the instrument
through which the United States administers various international
treaties to conserve endangered species, most notably the Convention
on International Trade in Endangered Species of Wild Fauna and Flora
("CITES"). 217 The ESA also calls on the Secretary to encourage "foreign countries to provide for the conservation of fish and wildlife and
plants including endangered species and threatened species listed pursuant to [the ESA]" 218 and provides various mechanisms for this task.
As with other ESA programs, international ESA duties of the FWS
and
219
other implementing agencies suffer from severe underfunding.
Debate over the ESA's international applicability centers on the
interagency consultation requirement. Section 7 requires all federal
agencies to consult with the FWS before proceeding with any action
that may affect a listed species. Although the ESA does not delineate
geographic bounds for activities that would trigger section 7 interagency consultations, approximately half of all listed species inhabit countries other than or in addition to the United States. 220 Section 7
implementing regulations from 1978 to 1986 reflected the international
scope of the endangered species lists, requiring consultations for agency
actions abroad. 22 1 Although rarely enforced, inclusion of foreign considerations in regulations overseeing federal agencies symbolized the
United States dedication to worldwide endangered species preservation.
The Secretary terminated international application of section 7
in 1986 when he promulgated replacement regulations that effectively
exempt agency actions in foreign countries from consultation. The revised regulations limit interagency consultation requirements to agency
actions occurring "in the United States or upon the high seas." 222 The
Secretary explained that limiting the reach of consultation regulations
was justified "because of the apparent domestic orientation of the consultation and exemption processes.., and because of 223
the potential for
interference with the sovereignty of foreign nations."
216. Id. § 1537(a).
217. For a discussion of current CITES implementation, see D. Favre, this issue.
218. 16 U.S.C. § 1537(b)(1).
219. See generally M. Trexler & L. Kosloff, International Implementation: The Longest
Arm of the Law?, in Balancing on the Brink: The Endangered Species Act and Lessons for

the Future 114 (K. Kohm ed., 1991).
220. As of Nov. 1992, 749 domestic species and 529 foreign species had been listed
under the ESA. U.S. Fish & Wildlife Serm., supra note 143, at 16.
221. The regulations required federal agencies to insure that their actions "in the
United States, upon the high seas, and in foreign countries, will not jeopardize the

continued existence of a listed species." 50 C.F.R. § 402.02 (1985).
222. 50 C.F.R. § 402.02 (1991).
223. 51 Fed. Reg. 19, 926 (1986).
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Several environmental groups challenged the new regulations
in court, leading to a protracted legal battle which ultimately ended
when the Supreme Court held that the environmental groups lacked
standing to bring the suit in the first place.2 24 The environmental groups
had charged that the Secretary's policy against applying consultation
requirements to agency actions abroad violated ESA language and intent.225 Despite the Supreme Court's ultimate dismissal of the case,
the 8th Circuit's reasoning on the substantive issue of the consultation
requirement's international applicability remains informative. Finding
that Congress intended the ESA to apply to federal projects on foreign
soil, the 8th Circuit ordered the Secretary to rewrite the regulations to
cover agency actions occurring outside the United States. 226 In particular, that court construed broad section 7 language that "each federal
agency must consult with the Secretary regarding any action to insure
that such action is not likely to jeopardize the existence of any endangered species" to indicate that Congress clearly intended section 7 to
apply abroad. 22 7 In addition, "endangered species" is defined without geographic limitation, official endangered species lists include a
large percentage of foreign species, and other ESA provisions expressly
mandate international and foreign objectives, "clearly demonstrat[ing]
congressional commitment to worldwide conservation efforts." 228 According to the court, "to limit the consultation duty in a manner which
protects only domestic endangered species runs contrary to such a
229
commitment."
The 8th Circuit's interpretation of the international reach of the
interagency consultation requirement provides persuasive reasoning
that may be followed in future cases concerning the ESA's international
application. There is also reasoning to support an opposite result, however. Unless Congress expresses an affirmative intention for a statute
to apply extraterritorially, federal courts must presume "legislation of
Congress ...is meant to apply only within the territorial jurisdiction
of the United States" and not give such statutes effect outside the
224. Defenders of Wildlife v. Hodel, 658 F. Supp. 43 (D. Minn. 1987) rev'd, 851 F.2d
1035 (8th Cir.) reh'g denied, (Oct 14, 1988) enf'd, 707 F. Supp. 1082 (D. Minn. 1989) aff'd
sub nom. Defenders of Wildlife v. Lujan, 911 F.2d 117 (8th Cir.) reh'g denied, (Dec. 10, 1990)
cert. granted, 111 S.Ct. 2008 (1991) rev'd on other grounds, 112 S.Ct. 2130 (1992). For an
overview of the judicial history of this case, see M. Anastasia, Note, Tile Endangered Species
Act and State Sovereignty: Defenders of Wildlife v. Lujan, 7 Conn. J. Int'l L. 87 (1991). The
environmental groups lacked standing because they failed to show that effects of the

regulations actually or imminently injured group members and thus failed to meet the
strict injury-in-fact requirement for presenting a case or controversy under Article III of
the Constitution. Lujan v. Defenders of Wildlife, 112 S. Ct. 2130 (1992).
225. Defenders of Wildlife v. Hodel, 658 F. Supp. 43, 45.
226. Defenders of Wildlife v. Lujan, 911 F.2d 117.
227. Id. at 122 (quoting 16 U.S.C. § 1536(a)(2)) (emphasis in original).
228. Id. at 122-123.
229. Id. at 123.

Fall 19931

THE ENDANGERED SPECIES ACT AT TWENTY

United States. 230 Thus, the issue of whether the consultation requirement is to apply abroad remains unsettled and confused. Congress
could stem the controversy surrounding section 7's international applicability by adding language to the ESA expressing whether the interagency consultation requirement is meant to apply to agency actions
abroad. Congress should recognize that such a tangible gesture, in ad-

dition to implementation and enforcement of CITES and other international wildlife treaties, would stress the United States' commitment
231
to preserving endangered species to the world community.

D. Reconciling Species Preservationwith the Rights of Private
Parties
Private Property Rights
Section 9 protects endangered animal species on private lands
from both federal and nonfederal actions. 232 A source of contention

over the ESA stems from the perception that section 9's protections often
conflict with traditional rights of private property owners. Frustrations
have escalated to the point that one private developer purposely eradicated one of the three known populations of the endangered San Diego
233
mesa mint to prevent delays in receiving federal construction grants.

In Montana, a rancher who shot and killed a protected grizzly bear
after losing several sheep to bears contended that section 9 prohibitions against killing listed species violated his constitutional right to
protect his private property.234 Eradication of protected species on private property generally reflects the hostility and injustice many landowners feel toward the ESA. 235 Conflict between species preservation and
private property rights pits the statutory prohibition of "taking" listed

species against the constitutional prohibition of the government's "taking" of private property without due compensation.
Section 9 prohibits the "taking" of any endangered species of
fish or wildlife. 236 The ESA defines "take" as "to harass, harm, pursue,
230. E.E.O.C. v. Arabian American Oil Co., 499 U.S. 244, (1991) (quoting Foley Bros.,
Inc. v. Filardo, 336 U.S. 281, 285 (1949)).
231. "By global standards, the United States is a prosperous and wealthy nation and,
in theory, ought to be able to effectively protect from extinction those species within its
control. The United States carries an important responsibility as an international model
for conservation as well as economic prosperity." T. Beatley, Planningfor Endangered Species:
On the Possibilitiesof Sharing a Small Planet, 15 Carolina Planning 32, 33 (1989).
232. See supra notes 68-74 and accompanying text.
233. R. Carlton, Property Rights and Incentives in the Preservation of Species, in The
Preservation of Species: The Value of Biodiversity 255, 261 (B. Norton ed., 1986).
234. Christy v. Hodel, 857 F.2d 1324 (9th Cir. 1988), cert. denied sub nona. Christy v.
Lujan, 490 U.S. 1114 (1989).
235. See generally M. Dolan, Nature at Risk in a Quiet War, L.A. Times, Dec. 20, 1992,
at Al.
236. 16 U.S.C. § 1538(a)(1)(B). See supra note 74 and accompanying text for a discussion
on prohibitions against taking threatened species.
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hunt, shoot, wound, kill, tra., capture, or collect, or to attempt to engage in any such contact." 23T Early court cases interpreted "take" narrowly, limiting it to intentional actions that directly injured a listed
species. 238 The noteworthy Palila decision expanded prohibitions on
taking to include critical habitat destruction, even absent evidence of
population decline or actual death of individual members of the listed
species. 239 In 1988, "take" was broadened to encompass destruction of
habitat that the FWS had not designated critical. 240 The connection between an activity and the death or injury of a listed species may be
quite tenuous and still rise to the level of a taking. 241 "Take" is not
limited to activities that cause listed species to decline, but includes
"habitat destruction that prevents the recovery of a species."2 42 Despite
ample case law, the precise definition of "take" remains elusive. One
commentator noted that the "diverse fact situations and the disparate
reasoning applied by the various courts [in section 9 takings cases]
243
suggest ad hoc decision making."
The Fifth Amendment of the Constitution uses "take" quite differently, stating "... nor shall private property be taken for public use,
without just compensation." 244 In general, the government's physical
occupation of private property for the public's benefit constitutes a
"taking" under the Fifth Amendment for which the government must
compensate the owner. 245 The Supreme Court has also recognized
some regulatory actions to be "takings" of private property. A regulatory action may constitute a "taking" if it fails to substantially advance
a "legitimate state interest" 246 or denies a landowner all economically
237. Id. § 1532(19). Much controversy over the term "take" stems from the regulatory
definition of "harm." See generally S. Quarles et al., The EndangeredSpecies Act & Its Application
to Private Lands, American Forest Resource Alliance Technical Bull. No. 91-06, 14-28
(1991); F. Cheever, An Introductionto the ProhibitionagainstTakings in Section 9 ofthe Endangered
Species Act of 1973: Learning to Live with a Powerful Species PreservationLaw, 62 U. Colo.
L. Rev. 109 (1991).
238. See, e.g., Sierra Club v. Froehlke, 534 F.2d 1289, 1304 (8th Cir. 1976).
239. Palila v. Hawaii Dep't. of Land and Natural Resources, 471 F. Supp. 985 (D. Haw.
1979), aff'd, 639 F.2d 495 (9th Cir. 1981).
240. Sierra Club v. Lyng, 694 F. Supp. 1260 (E.D. Tex. 1988), aff'd in part, vacated in
part sub non. Sierra Club v. Yeutter, 926 F.2d 429 (5th Cir. 1991).
241. Defenders of Wildlife v. EPA, 688 F. Supp. 1334 (D. Minn. 1988) (holding that
EPA's failure to cancel registration of strychnine, a pesticide known to have killed
endangered species, constituted a "taking" of those species), aff'd in part, rev'd in part,
882 F.2d 1294 (8th Cir. 1989).
242. Palila v. Hawaii Dep't. of Land and Natural Resources, 649 F. Supp. 1070, 1075
(D. Haw. 1986), aff'd, 852 F.2d. 1106 (9th Cir. 1988) (emphasis added).
243. Cheever, supra note 237, at 162.
244. U.S. Const. amend. V.
245. The extent of occupation may be quite minor. See, e.g., Loretto v. Teleprompter
Manhattan CATV Corp., 458 U.S. 419 (1982) (ruling that a foot-wide cable box placed
on an apartment building rooftop constituted a taking).
246. Nollan v. California Coastal Comm'n, 483 U.S. 825, 834 (1987).
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viable uses of his land. 247 Yet case law under the Fifth Amendment is
far from consistent. 248 The Court has not resolved the precise meaning of "legitimate state interest," stating only that the term covers "a
broad range of governmental purposes and regulations." 249 Likewise,
at what point "all" economical
the Court has not determined conclusively
250
uses of the property have been taken.
No court has found ESA restrictions on taking protected animals to rise to the level of a constitutional taking.251 In Christy, the
case of the rancher who shot a grizzly bear to prevent it from killing
his sheep, the 9th Circuit ruled that ESA prohibitions did not constitute a taking of private property and therefore the landowner was not
entitled to compensation. 252 The court granted summary judgment for
the government, holding that Christy's loss of sheep was the incidental result of reasonable regulation in the public interest. 253 The issue of
whether section 9 prohibitions constitute takings under the Fifth Amendment revolves around whether the government is attaining a public
good or protecting the public from harm. 254 The federal police power
247. Lucas v. South Carolina Coastal Council, 112 S. Ct. 2886 (1992). In Penn Cent.
Transp. Co. v. City of New York, 438 U.S. 104, 124 (1978), the Supreme Court established
that a regulation which denies a landowner's reasonable "investment-backed expectations"
would also constitute an economic taking. Cf. Pennsylvania Coal Co. v. Mahon, 260 U.S.
393, 415 (1922) (establishing the rule that "if regulation goes too far [in the diminution
of the property's value) it will be recognized as a taking").
248. The courts have never been clear on the point at which a regulation constitutes
a taking of private property. The Supreme Court itself has noted that "in 70-odd years
of... 'regulatory takings' jurisprudence, we have generally eschewed any 'set formula'
for determining how far is too far, preferring to 'engag[e) in essentially ad hoc, factual
inquiries."' Lucas, 112 S.Ct. at 2892 (quoting Penn Cent. Transp. Co., 438 U.S. at 124). Supreme
Court Justices have been split in recent opinions regarding Fifth Amendment takings.
See generally D. Large, The Supreme Court and the Takings Clause: The Search for a Better
Rule, 18 Envtl. L. 3 (1987).
249. Nollan, 483 U.S. at 834. Cf. Mugler v. Kansas, 123 U.S. 623 (1887) (declaring that
"legitimate state interests" include concerns for public health, safety, or welfare).
250. For instance, courts differ on whether regulations that deny a landowner all
economically viable uses of a portion of the property or most economically viable uses
of the whole of the property constitute a taking. Lucas, 112 S.Ct. at 2893 n.7. See also Large,
supra note 248, at 19-34.
251. Christy, 857 F.2d 1324, is the only case to address whether ESA's section 9 taking
prohibition constitutes a taking. In cases interpreting statutes similar to the ESA, however,
courts have found that laws protecting wild horses, eagles, and migratory birds do not
constitute Fifth Amendment takings. See, e.g., Mountain States Legal Found. v. Hodel,
799 F.2d 1423 (10th Cir. 1986), cert. denied, 480 U.S. 951 (1987); Andrus v. Allard, 444 U.S.
51(1979).
252. Christy, 857 F.2d 1324.
253. The 9th Circuit also rejected Christy's claims that the ESA and grizzly bear
regulations deny equal protection of the laws when applied to people who raise livestock
near grizzly bear habitat and that the FWS's application of the ESA deprived him of his
fundamental right under the Fifth Amendment to possess and protect his property.
Christy, 857 F.2d at 1328-34.
254. See H. Rolston, Property Rights and Endangered Species, 61 U. Colo. L. Rev. 283
(1990).
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allows government to prohibit activities that harm the public, 25 5 but
government may not regulate activities in order to obtain a public benefit without just compensation. ESA prohibitions against taking species
may be interpreted as preventing public harm. "Even though the loss
of life is to animals and plants, there is danger of loss, threat of serious harm to humans who lose, too, when these animals and plants vanish." 25 6 In reviewing Christy for certiorari, however, at least one Supreme
Court Justice found that ESA prohibitions against taking endangered
animals provide a public benefit to the detriment of selected individ25 7
uals, and therefore potentially represents a constitutional taking.
Some commentators charge that section 9 provisions unfairly
target ranchers and farmers, and that the section is selectively enforced. 2" Arguing that ESA prohibitions provide a public benefit at a
cost to landowners unfortunate enough to have protected species on
their property, some authors suggest that government should compensate
those landowners. 25 9 Such compensation would further burden an already over-extended ESA budget and imperil species protection. Others, interpreting ESA taking provisions as preventing a harm or nuisance

rather than providing a social benefit, claim that government need not
2 60
compensate for property losses that endangered species caused.
255. The Supreme Court potentially has limited the traditional nuisance defense in
land use cases. Lucas, 112 S.Ct. 2886. Previously, if a regulation depriving property owners
of the use of their land prevented a public harm, the government's action was an exercise
of police power and no compensation was due. The Lucas Court held, however, that
where a regulation deprives land of all economically viable uses, government must
compensate the property owner unless existing state property or nuisance law already
restricted the proposed land use. In other words, the legislature may not insulate itself
from takings liability through a determination that the activity it regulates is a nuisance.
The effect of Lucas on federal regulatory action is unclear. See generally B.
Pershkow & R. Housman, In the Wake of Lucas v. South CarolinaCoastalCouncil: A Critical
Lookat Six QuestionsPractitionersShould Be Asking, 23 Envtl. L.Rep. (Envtl. L. Inst.) 10,008
(1993). Because it addressed the constitutionality of a state regulation, Lucas may be
inapplicable to federal statutes and regulations. Id. If it is applicable, it may be applied
using each state's property and nuisance law, creating piecemeal federal takings
jurisprudence. Or, federal courts may apply Lucas by deciding takings cases through
reference to existing federal common-law nuisance provisions. Id. Application of Lucas
in this manner may be difficult, however, because many federal laws, including the ESA,
preempt the common law in their area, giving courts no basis for their decisions other
than the statute or regulation in question. Id.
256. Id. at 297.
257. Christy v. Lujan, 490 U.S. 1114, 1114 (1989) (White, J., dissenting) (stating that
"perhaps a government edict barring one from resisting the loss of his property is the
constitutional equivalent of an edict taking such property in the first place"), denying
cert. to Christy v. Hodel, 857 F.2d 1324 (9th Cir. 1989).
258. S.Elbadawi, Note, Grin and Bear It: The UnbearableConsequences of the Endangered
Species Act's Taking Restrictions,and the Huntfor a Solution. 41 Syracuse L. Rev. 1021 (1990);
Cheever, supra note 237, at 111.
259. See generally Elbadawi, supra note 258.
260. "In other words, losses to predators, like losses to drought and disease, are
among the risks the industry faces; they are the costs of doing business in the western
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Nevertheless, Congress should address inequities of prohibitions against
developing one's private property. One analyst calls for "expansive"
enforcement of the section 9 provisions, arguing that equitable enforcement of the law, in conjunction with private party exception
processes, 26 1 should diminish demands for compensation. 262 Another
author suggests attaching a special compensatory tax status to parcels
of land that contain listed species or their habitat-something akin to
a conservation easement. 263
The ESA does not prohibit the "taking" of listed plants on private property.2 64 Plants, unlike most wildlife, are linked to the land
and traditionally have been considered a part of the landowner's property. 265 Whether the federal government can prohibit private landowners from taking listed plant species on their land, as many authorities
suggest it should, thus involves a legal question distinct from the animal takings question. Nevertheless, court findings that destruction of
habitat constitutes a taking under the ESA, 266 as well as decisions under
other environmental laws, 267 suggest that extending the federal prohibition against taking animals to include plants would not constitute a
constitutional taking of private property. It has yet to be conclusively
26
decided whether rights of these species override property rights. 8
environment. A homeowner has no claim against the government when his house is
destroyed by a flood that the government could have prevented by damming a river.
Similarly, a rancher should have no claim if her cow is killed by wolves. Self-help
arguments are also inapposite: just as the homeowner has no right to dam the river
without federal authorization, so the rancher has no inherent right to kill wolves to protect
her property." Goble, supra note 182, at 116. See also Mountain States Legal Found. v.
Hodel, 799 F.2d 1423, 1428 n.8 (10th Cir. 1986) (en banc) (noting that damage to property
caused by wildlife is not a compensable taking despite governmental prohibition on
killing wildlife), cert. denied, 480 U.S. 951 (1987). For a contrary view, see Carlton, supra
note 233.
261. See infra notes 84-87 and accompanying text.
262. Cheever, supra note 237, at 197-99. "The unwillingness to enforce the section 9
taking prohibition fully has distorted the law of endangered species, creating a system
of unequal justice in which some groups and individuals are taken to court for acts that
would go unquestioned if committed by others." Id. at 111.
263. Rolston, supra note 254, at 301. Such a tax would not affect FWS or ESA funding,
but would reduce federal tax income.
264. For a review of section 9 prohibitions against harming listed plants, see infra
notes 71-72 and accompanying text.
265. G. Coggins & A. Harris, The Greening of American Law?: The Recent Evolution of
Federal Law for Preserving Floral Diversity, 27 Nat. Res. J. 247, 271 n.173 (1987).
266. See supra notes 239-242.
267. For example, the courts have held that denial of wetland development permits
under the Clean Water Act constitutes a taking only if it precludes all economically viable
uses of the property. See Deltona Corp. v. United States, 657 F.2d 1184 (Ct. Cl. 1981), cert.
denied, 455 U.S. 1017 (1982); Jentgen v. United States, 657 F,2d 1210 (Ct. Cl. 1981), cert.
denied, 455 U.S. 1017 (1982); Formanek v. United States, 26 CI.Ct. 332 (1992). State courts
in Wisconsin and New Hampshire have applied the benefit-harm distinction, ruling that
restricting development in wetlands prevents a public harm, and therefore falls within
the state's police power. Rolston, supra note 254, at 298-99, (citing Just v. Marinette
County, 201 N.W.2d 761 (1972) and Sibson v. State, 336 A.2d 239 (1975)).
268. See generally Rolston, supra note 254.
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Habitat Conservation Plans
Under the original ESA, when private development threatened
to violate section 9 take restrictions, the developer risked substantial
civil and criminal penalties, without exception. In 1982, Congress
amended the ESA, adding section 10's conservation planning process,
whereby state and private parties may apply for permits to take listed
species. 269 The core of section 10 is the habitat conservation plan
("HCP"), the private party counterpart to section 7's exemption process
for federal agencies. 270 Despite similarities, HCP requirements typically result in more comprehensive and rigorous analyses of an activity's effects on listed species than interagency consultations. An HCP
must identify likely impacts of a proposed project on listed species,
methods and funding that will "minimize and mitigate" these impacts,
alternatives to a proposed project, and any additional measures the
Secretary deems necessary.2 7 1 If the Secretary finds that the HCP will
not "appreciably reduce the likelihood of the survival and recovery of
the species in the wild," the applicant will receive a permit for taking
272
the listed species, as long as the takings are incidental to the project.
If the applicant violates or fails to implement provisions of the HCP,
the Secretary may revoke the take permit, effectively halting the project.

2 73

Habitat conservation plans offer a compromise solution to
species conservation under the ESA. Developers can move forward with
projects that may harm individuals of a listed species and "avoid multiple, successive and conflicting demands to mitigate the impact of development activities on endangered species." 2 74 Conservationists get
275
funding and assurances to set aside land to help protect listed species,
and FWS resources can be funneled into other pressing problems. If
carefully designed and implemented, section 10 engenders forward269. Endangered Species Act Amendments of 1982, Pub. L. No. 97-304, § 6, 96 Stat.
1411, 1422 (codified as amended at 16 U.S.C. § 1539(a)). For a detailed review of the
conservation planning process and its history, see R. Webster, Comment, Habitat Conservation
Plans under the Endangered Species Act, 24 San Diego L. Rev. 243 (1987). See also M. Bean
et al., Reconciling Conflicts under the Endangered Species Act: The Habitat Conservation
Planning Experience (1991) (analyzing HCPs and practical solutions to increase HCP
effectiveness).
270. Cheever, supra note 237, at 170-71.
271. 16 U.S.C. § 1539(a)(2)(A).
272. Id. § 1539(a)(2)(B).
273. Id. § 1539(a)(2)(C).
274. R. Thornton, Searching for Consensus and Predictability: Habitat Conservation
Planning under the Endangered Species Act of 1973, 21 Envtl. L. 605, 639 (1991).
275. At least one HCP has been criticized for leaving too little habitat for the listed
species it was meant to protect. See Webster, supra note 269, at 243 (arguing that an HCP
proposal to develop 75 percent of the Coachella Valley fringe-toed lizard's remaining
habitat adversely affects the species' chances of recovery).
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looking strategies to conserve listed species, often covering a wide
body of environmental concerns on a regional basis. 276 Furthermore,
by extending the option of an incidental take permit to anyone, the
HCP process "eliminates any excuse for a 'soft' interpretation of the
section 9 taking prohibition-an interpretation that limits its reach or
277
effect."
Despite the HCP's enormous potential to contribute to ESA conservation goals, many private parties ignore or circumvent section 10's
provisions, complaining that the HCP process is "cumbersome, unnecessarily expensive, or unreasonable in its requirements." 278 Congress acknowledged that a permit "may involve the expenditure of
hundreds of thousands if not millions of dollars" and noted that the
Interior Department called section 10 requirements "unduly complicated." 279 Through the HCP process, private business practices become
subject to public scrutiny, achieving consensus among disparate parties involved in the plan is difficult, and the developer must prepare
an environmental impact statement for the project. 28° While the HCP
exemption process has been hailed as making the ESA more flexible,
the permitting agency retains the ability to limit or prohibit any project which could affect an endangered species. 28 1 To circumvent the
HCP process, private parties often seek a federal nexus for their projects. 282 Currently, once a federal agency becomes even minimally involved in a project, its proponents may procure a take permit through
the section 7 consultation process which is perceived as less daunting
than section 10 requirements. 283 As a result of this practice and a general avoidance of the provision, private parties completed less than 20
HCP's in the first decade since the 1982 amendments, compared to hun284
dreds of section 7 interagency consultations that occur each year.
276. For instance, the San Bruno Mountain HCP, after which section 10 is modeled,
although focusing on conflicts between development and endangered butterflies, "sought
to preserve the diversity of species and their habitat on the mountain." Thornton, supra
note 274, at 622.
277. Cheever, supra note 237, at 177.
278. Irwin & Wigley, supra note 186, at 29. "In all cases, the plan preparation and

approval process has involved years of effort." Quarles et al., supra note 237, at 31.
279. Id. at 31 (citing H.R. Rep. No. 576, 97th Cong., 2d Sess. 46 (1982) and H.R. Rep.
No. 835, 97th Cong., 2d Sess. 31 (1982)).
280. For a review of these and other problems with the HCP process, see Thornton,
supra note 274, at 639-52.
281. Cheever, supra note 237, at 170.
282. For a discussion of this practice, see C. Carter, Comment, A Dual Track for
Incidental Takings: Reexamining Sections 7 and 10 of the Endangered Species Act, 19 B.C.
Envtl. Aff. L. Rev. 135, 163-65 (1991).
283. See, e.g., Soderberg & Larsen, supra note 203, at 171 ("Typically, a sufficient nexus
between a private act and agency action can be established by obtaining a federal permit,
such as a 'dredge and fill' permit under section 404 of the Clean Water Act.").
284. GAO Report, supra note 58, at 30, 36.
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Because the HCP process often provides expansive protection
for sensitive species, whether listed or not, and allocates at least some
costs to users of the species' habitats, it has the potential of being one
of the ESA's most effective conservation tools. Congress could promote
greater use of section 10 by outlining the HCP process to make the
planning task less complex and expensive. A recent appropriations bill
addressed the financial burden that the HCP process places on devel285
opers and would have established a fund for federal cost-sharing.
Also, Congress could encourage use of section 10's provisions by delineating the amount of federal involvement required to allow a project to proceed under section 7. For instance, activities funded or carried
out by federal agencies could qualify for section 7 consultations, whereas
projects only permitted by a federal agency would have to proceed
through section 10.286
E. Re-Evaluating PreservationPrioritiesand Policy
Legal and Administrative Biases
The ESA and associated implementing regulations and agency
policies focus conservation efforts on single, high-profile species, resulting in inequitable and ineffective allocation of limited FWS resources.287 Legislative biases against plant species, for instance, have
plagued ESA programs since Congress passed the ESA in 1973.288 The
original ESA did not prohibit the taking of listed plant species, and
protected endangered plants only from import, export, and interstate
and foreign commerce. Amendments in 1982 added private collecting
of endangered plants on public lands to the list of prohibited activities. 289 Since 1988, maliciously and knowingly damaging endangered
plants on federal lands and removing, damaging, or destroying plants
"in knowing violation" of any state law has constituted a violation of
the ESA. 290 Although recent reauthorizations have strengthened provisions regarding plants, legal protections remain skewed in favor of
animal species. 29 1 The ESA does not address vandalism of listed plant
285. H.R. 4045, 102d Cong., 1st Sess. (1991), would have established a $20 million
revolving fund to finance development of HCPs by state or local governments. Hunt &
Irvin, supra note 111, at 21.
286. Cf. Thornton, supra note 274, at 653 (suggesting that private parties pursuing
single projects or activities in a limited area be authorized to proceed under section 7
without establishing a federal nexus).
287. For an discussion on the root of these biases, see D. Linder, "Are All Species
Created Equal?" and Other Questions Shaping Wildlife Law, 12 Harv.Envtl. L. Rev. 157 (1988).
288. See generally Coggins & Harris, supra note 265.
289. Endangered Species Act Amendments of 1982, Pub. L. No. 97-304, § 9(b), 96
Stat. 1411, 1426 (1982) (codified as amended at 16 U.S.C. § 1538(a)(2)(B) (1988)).
290. Endangered Species Act Amendments of 1988, Pub. L. No. 100-478, § 1006(a),
102 Stat. 2306 (1988) (codified at 16 U.S.C. § 1538(a)(2)(B) (1988)).
291. Cf. Coggins & Harris, supra note 265, at 307 (concluding that "American plant
law remains primitive in comparison to American wildlife law, but further evolution is
likely").
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species on private property absent state laws prohibiting such acts, nor
does it prohibit landowners from destroying endangered plants or habitat on private property. Similar acts affecting habitat of endangered animal species are strictly illegal.
Administrative biases against plants are evident in the listing
and recovery planning processes. From 1985 through 1991, the median
population size of animal species at the time of listing was 1075 individuals for vertebrates and 999 individuals for invertebrates. 292 By contrast, the median population size of plant species listed during this same
period was fewer than 120 individuals. 293 The disparity in population
sizes between plant and animal species at time of listing may be partially attributed to the limited range and visibility of many plant species,
making them seem locally more numerous. As a result, plants do not
receive protection until their numbers are critically low, jeopardizing
their continued viability.294 Even after listing, recovery efforts for plant
species, which make up the majority of listed species, fall short of those
exerted towards recovering animal species. In 1990, for instance, endangered plants received less than 10 percent of FWS recovery funds,
despite the fact that conservation programs for plants
are generally more
295
effective than analogous programs for animals.
The ESA's bias against plant species stems from the traditional
view that because plants, unlike most animal species, are tied to the
land, they are the property of landowners. Yet current scientific understanding recognizes plants as the basis of ecosystem functions vital
to all animal species, including human beings. Every calorie that vertebrate species ingest, for instance, can be traced directly or indirectly
to a plant that first captured and stored energy from the sun in its own
tissues before it entered the food chain. Plants also convert carbon dioxide into breathable oxygen and are the source of innumerable valuable
296
substances, including many important medicines.
Administrative biases also result in disparate preservation efforts among animal species. In 1990, of $102 million budgeted for recovery of 591 listed species, over half went toward the recovery of only
12 species, including the grizzly bear, desert tortoise, northern spotted
owl, and bald eagle. 297 The inordinate amount of protection these few
species receive emphasizes the disproportionate attention the FWS and
other agencies focus on conservation of "charismatic megafauna:"
292. Wilcove et al., supra note 148, at 90.
293. Id. at 87.
294. From 1985 through 1991,39 plant species were listed when 10 or fewer individuals
were known to exist. Id. at 92.
295. F. Campbell, Endangered Plant Species Shortchanged: Increased Funding Needed, 9
Endangered Species Update 6, 6 (Nov./Dec. 1991).
296. See supra part 1.
297. S. Winckler, Stopgap Measures, 269 Atlantic Monthly 74, 77 (Jan. 1992).
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wildlife species that are exceptionally visible and attractive to the public. 298 The ESA expressly prohibits such a bias, particularly during recovery efforts, directing the FWS to "give priority to those... species,
without regard to taxonomic classification, that are most likely to benefit
from such [recovery] plans." 299 Nevertheless, external pressure on the
FWS has resulted in species listed based on political, rather than biological or ethical, priorities and focusing protective efforts on the least
politically controversial species. 3°° While focusing on charismatic species
protects examples of our natural heritage, it undermines the ESA's intent to preserve all listed species and their ecosystems. Like plants, less
charismatic species such as invertebrates typically
lack constituencies
31
to push for equal treatment under the law. 0
In stressing that ESA conservation measures apply to all species
requiring assistance regardless of taxonomic standing, Congress implied that resources for recovery and protection should be equitably
distributed among species. Section 9 conflicts with this conservation
mandate, however, affording greater protection to animal species than
to plant species. To encourage equitable treatment of all species under
the ESA, Congress should upgrade taking restrictions on plant species
to match those for animals, 302 recognizing that such an amendment
would create additional conflicts between economic activity and species
preservation and would also test the limits of the constitutionality of
30 3
section 9 taking prohibitions.
Equal treatment of all listed species is problematic in light of
the limited resources available for conservation and recovery programs.
Because funding for endangered species recovery will likely remain
insufficient to adequately address the problems of all listed species,
some basis for establishing conservation priorities may be warranted.
Although implicit and explicit systems for ranking species for listing
and recovery have existed for some time, the FWS has not followed
any consistent standard. 3 4 FWS personnel have stated that the agency
30 5
favors preservation of species "with the best chance of recovery"
and, conversely, that "those species that face the greatest threat are the
306
ones we address first."
298. Rohlf, supra note 162, at 275.
299. 16 U.S.C. § 1533(f)(1)(A) (emphasis added).
300. Rohlf, supra note 162, at 275.
301. D. Murphy, Invertebrate Conservation, in Balancing on the Brink of Extinction:
The Endangered Species Act and Lessons for the Future 181, 182 (K. Kohm ed., 1991).
302. But see Coggins & Harris, supra note 265, at 307 ("The differences between plants
and animals often are significant. We do not.., advocate sweeping, immediate elevation
of flora to a legal status equal to that enjoyed by some faunal species.").
303. See supra part III.D.
304. Since 1971, the FWS has had six different systems for ranking endangered
species. Mann & Plummer, supra note 106, at 59.
305. Mann & Plummer, supra note 106, at 58, quoting Keith Schreiner, ex-head of the
Office of Endangered Species at FWS.
306. Winckler, supra note 297, at 76, quoting John Fay, botanist with the FWS Division
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The current ranking system does not set criteria for selecting
which species should be the focus of recovery efforts. As a result, there
is no correlation between the recovery priority assigned to a species
and the amount that the FWS spends on its recovery. 30 7 Overall, the
FWS invests more in recovery of subspecies than on full species, more
on species with low recovery potential than on species with high recovery potential, and more on threatened species than endangered
species. 30 8 Congress should amend the ESA to better guide the FWS
in prioritizing species for preservation. For example, priority might be
given to species of greatest utility in protecting ecosystems and biodi3 09
versity, or to those with other important ecological or societal value.
Ecosystem Focus
In its basic approach to solving the species preservation problem, the ESA is more reactive than proactive. The ESA handles only the
most severe cases, waiting until species verge on extinction before its
protective mechanisms attempt to halt their demise. 310 It does little to
prevent species from becoming threatened or endangered in the first
place. While the FWS struggles with complicated problems of listed
species, habitat destruction and other activities imperiling other plant
and animal species continue and increase. These activities swell the
number of species warranting protection, while the FWS is unable to
3 11
recover or even begin protecting many of the species already listed.
The ESA as currently conceived and implemented therefore cannot effectively protect the majority of species from what Congress called
"economic growth and development untempered by adequate concern
312
and conservation."
of Endangered Species.
307. "Average expenditures for the eight species with a recovery priority of 1 [the
FWS's highest ranking] were $100,000 less than those for species with a priority of 6.
The government lavished an average of $53,200 on priority-IS species, but starved
priority-4 species with an average per-species budget of $5,500. More than half of the
$100 million that state and federal government devoted to endangered species was
awarded to eleven species-less than two percent of those on the list. A hundred and
fourteen species received no money at all." Mann & Plummer, supra note 106, at 59.
308. Id.
309. Rohlf, supra note 162, at 275. See also Doremus, supra note 40, at 328-33.
310. The ESA is directed at those species "in danger of extinction throughout all or
a significant portion of Itheirl range." 16 U.S.C. § 1532(6). Similarly, current FWS guidelines
"concentrate primarily on the magnitude and immediacy of threats facing species, thus
officially adopting an emergency room' approach to biodiversity conservation." Rohlf,
supra note 162, at 275. See also J. Scott et al., Species Richness: A GeographicalApproach to
Protecting Future Biodiversity, 37 Bioscience 782 (1987); D. Blockstein, Toward a Federal
Planfor Biological Diversity, 5 Issues in Sci. & Tech. 63, 66 (1989).
311. See supra part IIl.B.
312. 16 U.S.C. § 1531(a)(1).
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Congress has expressed an intent to save every threatened or
endangered species, at almost any cost. Yet when a species faces circumstances threatening enough to warrant listing, its role in its ecosystem probably is largely or entirely impaired, its recovery often will be
expensive, and it may have lost genetic variation critical to successful
recovery.3 13 A lack of social interaction, sensitivity to genetic and environmental factors, and difficulty in finding suitable mates may further hamper recovery of small populations. 314 As a species nears
315
extinction, the resources necessary to recover it increase dramatically.
Yet Congress has not authorized enough funds to cover even 5 percent
of the funds estimated to be needed for recovery of listed species over
the next 10 years. 316 ESA critics often term it a failure because in 20
3 17
years fewer than 20 species have been removed from the ESA list.
The endangered species problem reflects a growing loss of
ecosystems to economic activity. Somewhere between 21 and 51 percent of major terrestrial ecosystem types in the United States face unregulated exploitation. 3 18 Since ecosystem decline is a leading cause of
the growing numbers of federally endangered species, current scientific thought favors protecting entire ecosystems rather than single
species. 319 By protecting selected ecosystem types, we could effectively
manage several sensitive species simultaneously, ensuring continued
viability of species that likely would be added to the endangered species
list as their ecosystems disappear.320 Focusing on ecosystem preservation would shift attention toward a preventive maintenance program,
313. See generally M. Soule, Thresholds for Survival: Maintaining Fitness and Evolutionary
Potential, in Conservation Biology: An Evolutionary-Ecological Perspective 151 (M. Soule
& B. Wilcox eds., 1980).
314. R. Lande, Genetics and Demography in Biological Conservation, 241 Science 1455,
1457 (1988).
315. One study has shown that conservation of species in zoos and botanical gardens
costs ten to 10,000 times as much as conserving them in their natural habitats. D. Woodruff,
The Problems of Conserving Genes and Species, in Conservation for the Twenty-First Century
(D. Western & M. Pearl eds., 1989). See also M. Hutchins, Beyond Genetic and Demographic
Management: The Future of the Species Survival Plan and Related AAZPA Conservation Efforts,
10 Zoo Biology 285, 286 (1991) (stating that "captive propagation cannot be considered
a panacea for the endangered species problem and should only be implemented as part
of a more holistic effort to preserve species in their natural habitats").
316. Mann & Plummer, supra note 106, at 47.
317. See, e.g., supra note 131.
318. OTA Report, supra note 1, at 111.
319. For reviews of current thought on the potential role of ecosystem management
in preserving species, see Council on Environmental Quality, supra note 2, at 135-87; P.
Fiedler et al., The Contemporary Paradigm in Ecology and its Implications for Endangered
Species Conservation, 10 Endangered Species Update 7 (Jan./Feb. 1993).
320. "Where the conservation objective is to maintain as much biological diversity
as possible, the only practical and cost-effective approach is to maintain ecosystem
diversity."OTA Report, supra note 1, at 89-90. See also Linder, supra note 287, at 195
("Species not yet known to exist that will be lost under a species-by-species approach
might be preserved through an ecosystem approach.").

Fall 19931

THE ENDANGERED SPECIES ACT AT TWENTY

and resulting in a
preserving biologically healthy and diverse habitats
321
higher likelihood of preserving species numbers.
The ESA recognizes the potential importance of ecosystems as
a means of species conservation. Ecosystem preservation is a basic intent of the ESA, which seeks to "provide a means whereby the ecosystems upon which endangered species and threatened species depend
may be conserved." 32 2 This purpose comports with the fundamental
principle of ecology that "[sipecies do not exist independently; they
have co-evolved in ecosystems on which they depend. This means that
each individual species depends on some set of other species for its
continued existence." 323 An ecosystem approach, although consistent
with ESA language, is not effected by current implementation because
ESA provisions focus on single-species management. Critical habitat
324
designation, for example, does not necessarily protect ecosystems.
The ESA as currently implemented prohibits only those activities that
affect listed species. Activities that do not affect listed species are allowed to continue, even if they harm nonlisted species in the ecosystem.
Some ecologists advocate focusing recovery activities on "keystone" 325 species to increase the ESA's effectiveness in protecting entire ecosystems of species. This approach may be flawed, however,
because by definition the ESA does not address a species until it nears
extinction, at which point much of its habitat is likely gone. Destruction of a keystone species' habitat to the point that the species would
meet listing requirements would suggest there is no ecosystem left to
protect. As a result, recent scientific thought has moved away from advocating protection of keystone species as a basis for conservation
strategies. 326 Likewise, attempts to use "indicator" 3 27 species to protect ecosystems may be similarly flawed.
321. S. Radcliffe, Forestry at the Crossroads: Integrating Economic and Social Needs with
Biological Concerns, 90 J. Forestry 22, 25 (1992).
322. 16 U.S.C. § 1531(b).
323. B. Norton, Commodity, Amenity, and Morality: The Limits of Quantification in
Valuing Biodiversity, in Biodiversity 200, 203 (E. Wilson ed., 1988).
324. Cf. K. Yagerman, Protecting CriticalHabitat under the Federal Endangered Species
Act, 20 EnvtL L. 811,855 (1990) (arguing that, because critical habitat designation involves
cost-benefit analysis, "the strong protections afforded critical habitat pursuant to sections
7 and 9 must be implemented fully in order to avoid undoing entirely the statutory goal
of ecosystem preservation").
325. A keystone species is one that provides critical support to other species within
its ecosystem. L. Gilbert, Food Web Organizationand the Conservationof NeotropicalDiversity,
in Conservation Biology 11, 23 (M. Soule & B. Wilcox eds., 1980).
326. "In practice, the concordance in distribution among different species is often
weak unless they are tightly co-evolved, such as parasite and host." M. Hunter, Coping
with Ignorance: The Coarse-FilterStrategy for MaintainingBiodiversity, in Balancing on the
Brink of Extinction: The Endangered Species Act and Lessons for the Future 266, 272 (K.
Kohm ed., 1991). "[Tlhe type of community structure implied by the keystone-species
concept is largely undemonstrated in nature... [and) ambiguities and uncertainties [in
the definition and application of the term "keystone-species" indicate] the dangers
inherent in shaping conservation strategies around keystone species." L. Mills et al., The
Keystone-Species Concept in Ecology and Conservation, 43 Bioscience 219, 219 (Apr. 1993).
327. An "indicator" species is a plant or animal species whose ecological success can
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Proponents of an ecosystem approach to species protection frequently talk in terms of "coarse filters" and "fine filters." "The basic
idea behind the coarse filter approach to maintaining biodiversity is
to establish a set of reserves containing representative examples of all
the various types of communities in a given area... [that] will protect
viable populations of most species." 328 For species that fall through
the coarse filter, a "fine filter" based on single-species managementsuch as the ESA-is needed. One method proposed for filtering areas
for ecosystem protection is "gap analysis," a method of systematically
assessing all areas within a geographic329region based on existing vegetation types and species distribution.
One solution that might remedy problems inherent with the
single-species focus of the ESA is the creation of an endangered ecosystems act. 33° Such an act likely would be most effective if based on strategies like the "coarse filter" and "gap analysis" approaches. On the other
hand, management of ecosystems would be complex and difficult to
legislate, as scientific understanding of even the simplest ecosystems
is in its infancy.331 Proponents of ecosystem management continuously
grapple with the fact that ecosystems are not discrete entities with clear
boundaries. 332 Also, ecosystem protection would involve more political jurisdictions and landowners, creating greater potential for conflict, and would initially be more expensive than single-species protection
measures. 333 These difficulties should not prevent ecosystem legislation, however, because in the long term ecosystem protection will be
less expensive than single-species management 3 34 and could be effected if it "focuses on components but recognizes the linkages between
various parts of the system." 335 Congress could also mandate that management decisions be made consistent with protection of sensitive
be used as a measure for the health of other species or conditions too difficult to measure.
Landres et al., Ecological Uses of Vertebrate Indicator Species: A Critique, 2 Conservation
Biology 316, 317 (1988).
328. Hunter, supra note 326, at 268.
329. See generally J. Scott et al., Gap Analysis of Species Richness and Vegetation Cover:
An Integrated Biodiversity Conservation Strategy,'in Balancing on the Brink of Extinction:
The Endangered Species Act and Lessons for the Future 282 (K. Kohm ed., 1991).
330. See generally C. Hunt, Creating an Endangered Ecosystems Act, 6 Endangered
Species Update I (Jan./Feb. 1989); R. Noss, A Native Ecosystens Act (Concept Paper), Wild
Earth 24 (Spring 1991). The Portland Audubon Society has drafted a Model Endangered

Ecosystems Act that mirrors many of ESA provisions, including listing and recovery
planning processes, but inserting "ecosystem" in place of "species." Audubon Society
of Portland, Model Endangered Ecosystems Act (Sixth Draft) (Sept. 1990) (on file with
authors).
331. See D. Johnson & J. Agee, Introduction to Ecosystem Management, in Ecosystem
Management for Parks and Wilderness 3 (J. Agee & D. Johnson eds., 1988).
332. Hunt, supra note 330 at 1.
333. E. LaRoe, Implementation of an Ecosystem Approach to Endangered Species Conservation,
10 Endangered Species Update 3, 5-6 (Jan./Feb. 1993).
334. See, e.g., Scott et al., supra note 310, at 787.
335. Johnson & Agee, supra note 331, at 12.
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ecosystems, particularly those ecosystems that support endangered or
potentially endangered species.
Current trends toward decentralizing public land management
and reinforcing private property rights make preservation of all rep336 Inresentative ecosystems politically and economically unfeasible.
stead, proponents of "ecosystem management" advocate application
of an ecologically-based land stewardship ethic across all lands, regardless
of ownership. 337 A land stewardship approach that focuses on desired
ecological states, rather than products, might be more acceptable than
an attempt to add vast areas of land to the national wilderness area
and wildlife refuge systems, which are widely perceived to reserve land
for a single dominant use. 338 Lands that have been logged and grazed
but "remain essentially natural ecosystems... [i]f sensitively managed
can provide an income to their owners while contributing signifi...
cantly to the maintenance of biological diversity, particularly by serving as buffer zones." 339 The expense of managing private lands for
ecological functions and structures may warrant government subsidies
340
or other compensation, such as a reduction in property taxes.
Ecosystem protection does not preclude the need for the ESA.
While the "coarse filter" approach of ecosystem protection would be
effective in many cases, single-species conservation will remain appropriate in certain situations, as in protection of widely-ranging species
that might wander or migrate outside protected ecosystems. The ESA
has been highly successful in stabilizing populations of many individual species and "has almost certainly reduced to a trickle what would
otherwise have been a torrent of extinctions." 341 The ESA would be
336. H. Salwasser, An Ecosystem Approach to Endangered Species Conservation, in
Balancing on the Brink of Extinction: The Endangered Species Act and Lessons for the
Future 347, 348 (K. Kohm ed., 1991).
337. "There can be no lasting solution to ecosystem and natural resource management
problems in democratic societies except through a joint planning approach ....The very
nature of ecosystems dictates that broad, cooperative, and integrated approaches to
ecosystem management have to be developed." V. Gilbert, Cooperation in Ecosystem
Management, in Ecosystem Management for Parks and Wilderness 180, 182 (J. Agee and
D. Johnson eds., 1988).
338. "Ecosystem management focuses on the conditions of the (ecosystem], with
goals of maintaining soil productivity, gene conservation, biodiversity, landscape patterns,
and the array of ecological processes." Society of American Foresters, Sustaining Longterns Forest Health and Productivity,in Report of a Task Force of the Society of American
Foresters iv-v (1992). "The future for endangered species, as for all of life's variety, will
be determined by how quickly and how well we learn to integrate goals for a rich biotic
future with our growing need for resources for subsistence, commerce, recreation, and
spiritual renewal.... We need a more encompassing strategy for conserving biological
diversity-a strategy whose long-term success depends on conservation actions that protect
genetic resources, sustain population viability of all species, perpetuate natural biological
communities, and maintain a full range of ecological processes while meeting human
needs." Salwasser, supra note 336, at 248.
339. Hunter, supra note 326, at 278.
340. Id. at 279.
341. Bean, supra note 110, at 1.
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even more effective if implemented with ecosystem conservation as a
goal. 342 Priority could be given to integrated, multispecies recovery
plans and HCPs for both listed and candidate species within the same
ecosystem or ecological community.343 The current Interior Secretary
Babbitt has advocated just such a role for the ESA. 3 44 Thus, despite
criticisms to the contrary, a strong ESA will continue to play a crucial
role in the preservation of species, even if the focus changes to a more
holistic approach.

CONCLUSION
This article has addressed a few of many changes that could
be incorporated into the Endangered Species Act to further the important goals of species preservation. First and foremost, Congress and
the Administration should authorize and appropriate funds to ESA
programs in a manner that recognizes the ESA's importance to society.
Second, shifting national policy toward more effective methods of preserving species, such as resource management based on ecosystem protection, could potentially lessen the long-term expense of conservation
measures, as well as reduce conflicts with economic activity. Where an
ecosystem approach is not appropriate or effective, the ESA remains
the best way to preserve species. Exemption procedures and other exceptions under the ESA encourage judicious weighing of economic concerns against the conservation of endangered species. Such procedures,
when used judiciously, relieve economic pressures that accumulate as
a result of species preservation and help protect the long-term integrity
of the ESA. Amendments to the ESA's basic provisions, however, must
be consistent with the ESA's intent to protect and recover as many sensitive species as possible.
Laws implementing scientific principles become outdated if they
fail to change and grow with current scientific thinking and changing
societal values. The basic objective of the ESA is to protect threatened
and endangered species, and to encourage species recovery. Yet the
means for attaining this objective must remain flexible to maximize ef342. As settlement to a recent lawsuit, the FWS formalized a commitment to emphasize
multiple species listings or proposals that address entire ecosystems. Glitzenstein, supra
note 150, at 3.
343. This proposition is consistent with legislative intent. See, e.g., H.R. Rep. No. 835,
97th Cong., 2d Sess. 31 (1982), reprintedin 1982 U.S.C.C.A.N 2807, 2871 (stating that the
purpose of section 10 is to establish "long-term commitments regarding the conservation
of listed as well as unlisted species") (emphasis added). See also Council on Environmental
Quality, supranote 2, at 158 (discussing a recovery plan that successfully applies ecosystem
management techniques).
344. See, e.g., W. Stevens, InteriorSecretary is Pushing a New Way to Save Species, N.Y.

Times, Feb. 17, 1993, at Al.
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ficiency and effectiveness, as well as to remain politically viable. Few
citizens would argue that we should not protect the creatures with which
we share this planet, if for no other reason than that they are important to our welfare. On the other hand, law and policy must simultaneously recognize pressing needs of society, because the strength of
society dictates our ability to preserve species. If we continue to drive
species to extinction, however, we irreversibly alter the planet. Although the manifestation of this alteration is far from certain, the uncertainty of the outcome should foster certainty in our intent.

